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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
Unqer all state unemployment insurance (UI) systems it is possible for claimants to
collect benefits while employed and earning wages. The weekly benefit amount is usually
unaffected for earnings below some threshold level, while earnings above the threshold
frequently reduce the weekly benefit amount by some fraction of earnings.
The legislature of Washington State authorized a field experiment to investigate if
reemployment incentives in the ill partial benefit system could be improved by "allowing
.unemployment insurance claimants to keep a greater portion of their weekly benefits when
engaged in part-time or temporary employment." (Engrossed Senate Bill 5920, Chapter 187,
Laws of 1994)
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Currently in Washington State, earnings by a beneficiary who is otherwise eligible for
ill will reduce benefits by 3/4 of every dollar earned above $5. No benefits are paid after
earnings reach $5 plus 4/3 times the weekly benefit amount (WBA). Claimants randomly
assigned to receive benefits according to the existing earnings deduction fonnula were
considered to be in the "control" group for the experiment.
The proposed alternative system reduces benefits by 2/3 of every dollar earned above
$15, with zero benefits paid after earnings reach $15 plus 3/2 times the weekly benefit amount.
Claimants randomly assigned to the proposed earnings deduction fonnula were considered to
be in the "treatment" group for the experiment. The existing and proposed systems are
presented graphically in Figure A.
For a claimant who qualifies for a weekly benefit amount (WBA) of $300 under the
existing Washington system, which applies to claimants in the control group, $100 in reported
weekly earnings would result in a benefit check of $228, for a total weekly income of $328.
A treatment assigned claimant with a WBA of $300 and reported earnings of $100 would be
sent a benefit check for $243, yielding a total weekly income of $343.
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Figure A
ill Earnings Deduction Schedules*
Existing and Alternate Systems for Washington
*Examples assume WBA = $300
Existing System: Earnings Disregard = $5, Earnings Reduction Rate = 3/4
Alternate System: Earnings Disregard = $15, Earnings Reduction Rate = 2/3
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SAMPLE DESIGN
Enrollment began at the start of the fourth calendar quarter in October 1994 and
continued for a 52-week period. Twenty-five percent of eligible claimants were randomly
selected for the trial program, with the remaining seventy-five percent assigned to the control
group. Enrollment was done by mail state-wide, with claimants establishing new benefit years
at any job service center in the state being potentially eligible for the trial program. Random
assignment to treatment and control groups was achieved by using the last two digits of each
claimant's Social Security Number since these digits are randomly assigned by the Social
Security Administration. The expected result of random assignment is that the average
characteristics of individuals in each of the groups will be the same.
TESTS FOR RANDOMIZATION
Treatment-control difference tests performed on 92 descriptive measures revealed no
more significant differences than would be expected by a random process. Random assignment
to treatment and control groups was successfully achieved for the experiment. The appeal of
classically designed field experiments with large samples is that differences in outcome
measures can be attributed to the experimental treatment, since on average the groups are the
same except that one group is exposed to the treatment.
TREATMENT IMPACT ESTIMATES
The aim of the experimental treatment was "to encourage workers receiving
unemployment insurance benefits to seek employment opportunities and return to full-time
employment with the result that the unemployment insurance trust fund is positively affected."
Therefore in doing the evaluation of the ill earnings deduction experiment the focus was on the
outcome measures: weeks of UI claimed, weeks claimed with earnings, weeks compensated,
dollars of UI compensation, earnings reported on continued claims forms, and the rate of
exhausting UI benefit entitlement.
The fmal analytic sample totaled 278,055 including 69,105 treatment assigned claimants
and 208,950 control assigned claimants. Table A summarizes the impact estimates on the
essential outcomes over the whole benefit year and during the frrst spell of insured
unemployment. For weeks claimed (WC) the control group mean was 16.51 weeks while the
treatment impact was 0.39 weeks. There was no treatment impact on weeks claimed with no
earnings (WCNE), but for weeks claimed with earnings (WCE) 3.68 weeks were claimed by
control g)."oup members and there was a significant treatment impact of 0.36 weeks.
Among the weeks claimed with earnings (WeE), for the control group a slim majority
had earnings too high to qualify for a ill benefit payment. For the treatment group, the impact
was 0.57 on weeks with earnings low enough to qualify for a UI benefit payment (WCEUI)
and -0.20 weeks when earnings were too high (WCENill). This pattern suggests that
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Table A.
Outcome
Summary of Treatment Impacts
Benefit Deadweight Behavioral
Year Cost Response
WC - Weeks claimed of VI
Control Mean 16.51
Treatment Impact 0.39**
WCNE - Weeks claimed of VI with no earnings reported
Control Mean 11.66
Treatment Impact -0.03
WCE - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported
Control Mean 3.68
Treatment Impact 0.36**
WCEUI - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported and a VI payment
Control Mean 1.76
Treatment Impact 0.57**
WCENUI - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported and no DI payment
Control Mean 1.92
Treatment Impact -0.20**
WCUI - Weeks claimed and a VI payment
Control Mean 13.41
Treatment Impact 0.54**
UITOTAL - VI benefits received in Total
Control Mean $2,731
Treatment Impact 67**
FfEWEEKS - Full-time equivalent weeks of VI compensation
Control Mean 12.33
1.76 2.09
0.33** 0.24**
1.92 1.59
-0.33** 0.13**
13.41 13.74
0.33** 0.21**
$2,731 $2,770
39** 28**
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Note: Control group means are provided for reference in examining treatment impacts.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
Treatment Impact
EXHAUST - Proportion of beneficiaries who receive their full VI
entitlement in benefit payments
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
0.28**
0.268
0.006**
0.19** 0.09**
treatment assigned claimants had a clear understanding of the rules in effect. Treatment
subjects claimed more weeks when they had earnings low enough to allow qualification for a
UI benefit payment. Furthermore, treatment assigned beneficiaries claimed fewer weeks when
earnings were too high to qualify for a benefit payment.
For total weeks with some compensation (WCUI), the control group collected 13.41
weeks and the treatment group collected a benefit in an additional 0.54 weeks. Not
surprisingly, the treatment impact on benefits also came in weeks when earnings were
reported. The total benefit year compensation (UlTOTAL) for control group members·
averaged $2,731 with a treatment impact of $67. The more generous earnings deduction
formula may have increased part-time work effort, but it neither reduced overall benefit receipt
nor induced a quicker return to regular full-time work.
DEADWEIGHT COST AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE
. If there were no behavioral response to the treatment offer beneficiaries wo~ld still
receive larger benefit checks without doing a thing. These increased payments which result
from the program change without a behavioral change can be called "deadweight cost." The
treatment impacts presented above can be decomposed into tWo parts: the deadweight cost and
the behavioral response.
Table A presents deadweight and behavioral response estimates for four outcomes. An
average of 0.33 weeks claimed with earnings which were not compensable under existing law
would become compensa~le under the proposal, so that $39 of the average increased ill
payment is a deadweight cost. The behavioral response was to increase weeks claimed with
earnings and a ill payment by 0.24 weeks for a mean $28 in extra benefits paid.
Both the "deadweight cost" and the behavioral response contribute to additional ill
benefit payments from the ill trust fund. It was known before the experiment that the
deadweight cost would be positive, it was hoped that the behavioral response would operate in
the opposite direction and dominate the deadweight cost. Unfortunately this did not happen.
AGGREGATE COST OF PROPOSED EARNINGS DEDUCTION FORMULA
Estimates of the aggregate cost of the experiment are given in Table B. The third row
reports that the experimental earnings deduction formula caused total ill payments to increase
by $4.6 million or 0.61 percent. Additionally, the table reports that $2.7 million or 0.35
percent of all benefits paid were deadweight costs of the treatment while $1.9 million or 0.25
percent were due to the behavioral response. Table C shows that had the more generous
earnings deduction formula been implemented state wide during the period, the additional cost
would have cost been $18.5 million or four times the cost of randomly offering the
experimental program to 25 percent of beneficiaries.
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Table B. Aggregate Cost of ·Proposed Earnings Deduction Formula
UI Benefits Sample Total UI Percent of
per Recipient Size Payments UI Payments
Treatment $ 2,797 69,105 $ 193,304,652
Control $ 2,731 208,950 $ 570,556,781
Impact $ 67** 69,105 $ 4,607,230 0.61%
(5.28)
Deadweight - $ 39** 69,105 $ 2,677,128 0.35%
(4.35)
Response $ 28** 69,105 $ 1,930,103 0.25%
(2.20)
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
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Cost of Proposed Earnings Deduction Formula had it been Universally
Implemented
2.44%
Percent of
UI Payments
UI Benefits Sample Total UI
per Recipient Size Payments
Proposed $ 2,797 278,055 $ 777,792,129
Existing $ 2,731 278,055 $ 759,254,202
Additional Cost $ 18,537,927
Table C.
ESTIMATED IMPACTS ON EARNINGS
Outside of the treatment impact on weeks and dollars of ill benefits the most important
impact of the treatment, which was designed to induce beneficiaries to return faster to full time
work by making part time work more appealing, is the impact on earnings. Earnings impacts
are reported 'in Table D using data from several sources. The flIst row of Table D lists the
mean total earnings reported on continued claim forms by beneficiaries during their benefit
year. The treatment group mean earnings reported of $1,317 exceed the control group mean
reported earnings by a statistically significant $99.
The" third row of Table D reports on earnings as recorded in quarterly wage records
based on employer reports. Naturally, the totals are far greater than the amounts reported on
continued claim forms since wage records include earnings of workers who have returned to
full time work and stopped claiming ill benefits. By this measure, there is no statistically
significant difference between benefit year earnings of treatment and control·group members.
This suggests that the treatment impact observed for earnings listed on continued claim forms
may be simply a reporting phenomenon rather than evidence of a real change in economic
behavior.
As a further check to see if there could be some other explanation for the differences in
earnings reported, the fourth row of Table D reports on base period earnings which are used to
help determine the amount and duration of ill benefit entitlement for claimants. Just as for
earnings based on the benefit year wage records, the base period earnings are not statistically
different between the treatment and control groups. This is further evidence to suggest that the
statistically significant gain in earnings observed through reports on continued claim forms
might not be evidence of added productivity, but rather only an indication of more faithful
compliance with earnings reporting requirements for claimants.
SUBGROUP ANALYSIS
There was no strong evidence of different a response to the treatment across objectively
defmed population subgroups. Nonetheless, the analysis did reveal some tendencies.
The most marked differences across subgroups within a category was for race/ethnicity.
While the subgroup treatment impact estimates were statistically significant for blacks on only
two of the seven outcome measures examined, it appeared that among all subgroups in all
categories blacks exhibited the most favorable response to the more generous earnings
deduction formula.
Treatment impacts for occupational categories grouped by occupational collar color
were significantly different for some outcome measures. The results suggested that treatment
assigned blue collar (manual) workers tended to claim more ill benefits, draw more ill
benefits and be more likely to exhaust their benefit entitlement than white collar workers.
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Table D. Treatment Impacts on Earnings
Treatment
Mean
Control
Mean
Treatment
Impact
Reported in Benefit Year
Reported in First Spell
Benefit Year Wage Records
Base Period Earnings
Sample Size
$1,317
$183
$13,214
$18,598
69,105
$1,218
$118
$13,276
$18,524
208,950
$99
(7.0)
$65
(28.8)
-$62
'(0.9)
$74
(1.3)
Note: Base period earnings will normally exceed benefit year earnings because (1) there is unemployment in the
benefit year, and (2) wage records for the benefit year does include earnings on federal jobs or interstate jobs
while these earnings are added to determine base period earnings.
Also, earnings in the benefit year based on wage records were estimated on a sample which excluded 63
persons in the control group and 15 persons in the treatment group who showed earnings in at least one
quarter exceeding $100,000.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
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Among education subgroups, the most educated group tended to claim the most weeks,
draw the most full time equivalent weeks of benefits, and be most likely to exhaust ill benefits
in response to the treatment offer. Finally, the response of beneficiaries across income groups,
as defmed by their base period earnings, was remarkably uniform.
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Benefit-cost analysis of the proposed earnings deduction formula was conducted from
four different perspectives: the ill system, federal and state government taken as a whole, the
state government of Washington, and total society. A summary of the per beneficiary benefit-
cost analysis is presented in Table E.
Since treatment assigned claimants drew a mean $67 more in ill benefits over the
benefit year than did control group members, the benefit to the Washington state ill system of
the change in the formula is estimated to be -$67. There would be no recurring costs beyond
what is currently experienced for handling claims with reported earnings. Therefore the net
benefit to the Washington state ill system of the change in the ill earnings deduction formula
is estimated to be -$67 per beneficiary.
Given that reported earnings over the benefit year increased by an estimated $99 per
treatment assigned beneficiary, federal tax revenue will increase about $15 per beneficiary, and
Washington state sales tax revenue would increase by about $7. Combined with the negative
benefit due to increased UI payments and the zero administrative costs, per beneficiary net
benefits to all government are estimated to be -$45.
With the estimated earnings increase of $99 per treatment assigned beneficiary,
Washington state sales tax revenue would increase by about $7. Combined with the negative
benefit due to increased UI payments and the zero administrative costs, per beneficiary net
benefits to Washington state government are estimated to be -$60.
The net benefit to total society is the sum of all benefits and costs to the individuals that
comprise the society. The main benefit is the $99 per person increase in earnings of those
given the more generous formula. The measurable costs incurred to produce that additional
income are the administrative costs of an on going program which are estimated to be zero.
The estimated net social benefit is therefore $99 per person. There are two critical
assumptions underlying this computation. The fIrst is that the value of foregone leisure is zero.
Since this is unlikely to be the case, our estimate of net benefits is overstated by an unknown
amount. Another assumption involved in computing the social net benefits estimate is that
there is no displacement of persons not offered the more generous earnings deduction formula.
If the gain in earnings of treatment assigned claimants was due in any part to a reduction in
earnings by ill beneficiaries not offered the new formula, or a reduction in earnings by
workers not involved with the UI system, an adjustment would have to be deducted from the
earnings gain estimated.
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Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Washington UI Earnings Deduction Experiment
Net Benefits per offer:
Table E.
UI System
Benefits:
Costs:
All Government
Benefits:
Costs:
In Compensation
Administrative Costs
Federal Tax Revenue
State Tax Revenue
UI Compensation
Administrative Costs
-$67
o
-$67
$15
7
-67
o
Net Benefits per offer: -$45
Washington State Government
Net Benefi!, per offer:
Net Benefits per offer:
$99
o
o
$99
$7
-67
-$60
- xiv-
Administrative Costs
Earnings
Administrative Costs
Tax Revenue
ill Compensation
Costs:
Benefits:
Costs:
Benefits:
Society
SUMMARY OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
The more generous earnings deduction formula appears to yield a net cost to the ill
system, to government as a whole, and to the state government of Washington, additional
revenue sources would be needed to fmance the program change. A net benefit to society as a
whole has been estimated, but there are many caveats on this fmding. The value of forego~e
leisure has not been deducted, and the possibility of displacement exists. Also, the impact on
earnings was estimated using information reported by beneficiaries on continued claims forms.
As discussed above, the estimate of earnings impact based on claim reports differs-from
that found with data from quarterly wage records for the benefit year. The quarterly wage
records suggest no earnings difference between treatment and control groups. While there are
time lags and other administrative reasons why the quarterly wage records report lower than
actual earnings for the period, these factors should equally affect records for treatment and
control group members. This suggests that the higher earnings observed on continued claim
forms by treatment assigned claimants may be simply a reporting phenomenon rather than
evidence of actual additional economic output. Perhaps being in an experimental treatment
group induces beneficiaries to report more of their earnings since they believe the state is more
closely monitoring their employment activity, or it may be the case that the more liberal
earnings deduction formula simply encourages beneficiaries to be more forthright in reporting
income during their benefit year because they get to keep slightly more.
From most perspectives the more generous earnings deduction formula did not yield net
benefits, and while the net social benefit is computed to be positive this is based on several
tenuous assumptions.
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An Evaluation of the Washington State
Unemployment Insurance Earnings Deduction Experiment
1. Introduction
Recent proposals for improving the federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system
have emphasized reemployment incentives. For example, beneficiaries who are identified
through profiling as most likely to exhaust entitlement are now required to accept enhanced job
search assistance.
Somewhat overlooked during the recent phase of reform has been the provisions for
paying benefits to part-time workers. This is particularly surprising in view of the dramatic'
recent growth in part-time, temporary, and contingent employment.
In all of the 53 ill systems in the United States it is possible for ill claimants to collect
benefits while employed and earning wages. The weekly benefit amount is usually unaffected
.for earnings below some threshold level, while earnings above the threshold frequently reduce
the weekly benefit amount by some fraction of earnings. To avoid unnecessarily prolonged
spells of unemployment it is important that beneficiaries are always better off by working, and
that a beneficiary's income continuously increases as hours worked increase.
In several of the ill systems across the United States the partial benefit schedules
include significant discontinuities which introduce cliff effects in the income paths of partial
benefit recipients. These situations where income suddenly drops as earnings rise probably
lead to unnecessarily prolonged spells of unemployment.
While the partial benefit schedule in Washington state does not include severe work
disincentives, the legislature of Washington state authorized a field experiment to investigate if
reemployment incentives in the system can be improved. The purpose of the experiment was
to:
review incentives that encourage workers receiving unemployment insurance
benefits to seek employment opportunities and return to full-time employment
with the result that the unemployment insurance trust fund is positively affected.
[The authorizing legislation said that] the employment security department shall
undertake a pilot project to determine the effect of allowing unemployment
insurance claimants to keep a greater portion of their weekly benefits when
engaged in part-time or temporary employment. (Engrossed Senate Bill 5920,
Chapter 187, Laws of 1994)1
IThe full text of Engrossed Senate Bill 5920, Chapter 187, Laws of 1994 for Washington state appears in
Appendix A to this report. It is this bill which required a field experiment to evaluate a more generous earnings
deduction formula for UI beneficiaries.
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That the Washington State legislature agreed to fmance a field experiment to investigate
the practicality of a contemplated program change is an example of modem public management
at the highest level. Concerning the need for field experiments to guide social policy, Alice
Rivlin (1971) wrote that, "information necessary to improve the effectiveness of social services
is impossible to obtain in any other way. "
The defIning feature of a social experiment is random assignment. With large sample
sizes unbiased estimates of the impacts of a trial program are available by a simple comparison
of means on outcome variables of interest. The fundamental problem in program evaluation is
identification of an appropriate comparison group--random assignment is the only way to
assure comparability between treatment and control groups, since only random assignment
eliminates the problem of self selection by claimants receiving the treatment.
It has often been said that the states are laboratories of democracy. For Washington
State, this has literally been the case in developing ill policy. In recent years the Washington
State Employment Security Department has been engaged in a series of field experiments to
evaluate the effects of various possible ill program changes. In 1986 enrollment into the
Tacoma alternative work search experiment took place (Johnson and Klepinger, 1994), in 1988
the Washington reemployment bonus experiment was conducted (O'Leary, Spiegelman, and
Kline, 1995), and in 1989 the Washington self-employment experiment took place (Benus,
Wood, and Grover, 1994). The unemployment insurance earnings deduction experiment is
only the most recent example of using sound research to inform responsible public policy in
Washington State.
2. Experimental Design
2.1 Treatment Design
Under current Washington State law, earnings by a beneficiary who is otherwise
eligible for UI will reduce benefits by 3/4 of every dollar earned above $5. No benefits are
paid after earnings reach $5 plus 4/3 times the weekly benefit amount (WBA). To evaluate the
proposal, claimants randomly assigned to the existing earnings deduction fonnula are
considered to be in the "control" group for the experiment.
The proposed alternative system reduces benefits by 2/3 of every dollar earned above
$15 with zero benefits paid after earnings reach $15 plus 3/2 times the weekly benefit amount.
Claimants randomly assigned to the proposed earnings deduction fonnula would be considered
to be in the "treatment" group for the experiment. The existing and proposed systems are
presented graphically in the Figure 1.
The simple algebra of a partial benefit system involves:
E = weekly earnings,
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R = the weekly earnings disregard,
t = the fraction of earnings deducted from benefits,
Y = total weekly income,
WBA = the weekly benefit amount,
and is described by a single equation:
Y = E + WBA-tX(E-R),
a claimant works off the system when WBA = t X (E - R) or:
E* = (WBA/t) + R,
this is called "breakeven earnings" since E* = Y*.
Under the existing Washington system R = $5 and t = 3/4 so that for WBA = $300,
E* = y* = $405; if E = $100 then Y = $328.75. Under the proposed Washington system R
= $15 and t = 2/3 so that for WBA = $300, E* = y* = $455; if E = $100 then Y =
$343.33.
During the period of benefit eligibility, ill essentially provides a minimum weekly
income. Under a UI partial benefit system with good work incentives, a claimant is always
better off by increasing hours of work.
2.2 Sample Design
Enrollment Timing:
Enrollment began at the start of the fourth calendar quarter in October 1994 and
continued for a 52 week period.
Enrollment was started in the frrst week of a calendar quarter and done for a whole year
so as to smooth the claims load variations which occur at the beginning of each quarter because
of the desire by claimants to use the most recent wage information in setting their weekly
benefit amount. It was also hoped that having enrollment for one full year would also purge
the sample of any regular seasonal factors.
Sample Size:
The sample design called for twenty-five percent of eligible claimants, to be randomly
selected and offered the trial program. Nearly all others establishing new benefit years during
the enrollment period were assigned to the control group.
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The proposed change in the earnings deduction formula is very modest, and was
expected to yield a very small behavioral response. A preliminary estimate of the behavioral
response to this change was estimated to be 0.05 weeks of ill payments over the benefit year;
To reliably detect a response this small, a sample size of about 550,000 would be required.
Enrollment of this sample size would require a 50-50 random assignment of all new
beneficiaries state-wide for 5 years, because about 220,000 are expected to start new benefit
years every 12 months. Ignoring the small behavioral response, the additional "deadweight"
cost due to increased benefit payments under the proposed earnings deduction system would be
nearly $38 million in current dollars. This scale of project is clearly impractical, because of
the time and cost involved. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the legislature would be interested
in enacting °a program change which yielded so small a response at such a huge public cost.
The judgment that 55,000 persons randomly assigned to the proposed system is the
minimum necessary, was based on the following practical considerations:
(1) it is unreasonable to conduct enrollment for more than one year,
(2) about 220,000 new benefit years are expected to start annually,
(3) the size of smallest impact which may be of interest to the legislature is probably no
smaller than 3% on reported earnings, and 1% on weeks of benefits.
(4) assigning somewhat less than half of eligible claimants to the treatment,
allows the control group to be relatively larger thereby increasing the effective
treatment sample size when conducting the impact analysis,3
(5) while the behavioral response may save money for the ill trust fund, it is likely that
there will be a large additional "deadweight cost" associated with liberalizing the
earnings deduction schedule-the added benefit payments which will be made in the
absence of any behavioral response.
An unbalanced design with approximately one-quarter of claimants assigned to
treatment status and the remaining three-quarters assigned to control status was expected to
20'Leary (1994) developed the preliminary estimate of response to the change in the earnings deduction
formula using the control group data from the Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiment (WREB). A °
summary of the WREB design and fmdings is given in O'Leary, Spiegelman and Kline (1995).
3When treatment and control groups are of unequal size, the relevant measure of sample size is called the
harmonic mean. The harmonic mean or effective sample size is two times the product of the sample sizes divided
by the sum of the sample sizes: l1tJ = [2I1A:/(~ + !1Jl, where ~ is the treatment group size and De is control
group size. By this formula it can be seen that with ~ = 55,000, and De = 165,000 the effective sample size is
82,500.
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allow detection of a 3% change in reported earnings by claimants, a 2.4% change in weeks
with earnings reported by claimants, and a 1% change in weeks of benefits. It is unlikely that
impacts much smaller than this will be of interest to the legislature.
Site Selection:
It was decided to conduct enrollment by mail state-wide, with claimants establishing
new benefit years at any job service center in the state being potentially eligible for the trial
program.4
Enrolling all claimants state-wide into either the treatment or control group for a 52
week period was deemed appropriate because:
(1) it will yield a sample representative of the state-wide claimant population,
(2) it will avoid problems which might result with a shorter enrollment period due to
seasonal variations in the volume and composition of the claims load,
(3) it will yield the required sample sizes.
2.3 Enrollment Procedures:
In the earnings deduction experiment, randomization was achieved by using the last two
digits of each claimant's Social Security Number for assignment to either the treatment or
control group. Since the last two digits of a Social Security Number are randomly assigned,
the expected result of the process is that the average characteristics of individuals in each of the
groups will be the same. Random assignment of eligible claimants was done in an automated
4Excluded from the pool of those eligible for enrollment were persons involved with shared work (coded
as Job Service Center (JSC) 980) and those fuing interstate claims (JSC 990). The fmal sample for analysis
included about 2.6 percent of beneficiaries coded as JSC 980 or 990. This occurred because the samples were
drawn after benefit years concluded by which time some claimants had changed their JSC designation.
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fashion. Special lines of computer code were added to the algorithm which evaluates a
claimant's eligibility for benefits based on prior earnings. The day after fuing for benefits
claimants randomly selected to have the trial partial benefits schedule were mailed an
information sheet describing the program change and a new earnings deduction chart. A copy
of the information sheet used is given in Appendix B together with a copy of the Earnings
Deduction Project Chart. This represents the experimental instructions communicated to
treatment assigned claimants. The information sheet provided a toll free telephone number
allowing questions from treatment assigned to be answered consistently from the project
central office in the state capital of Olympia.
It was decided that information about selection for treatment and the trial partial
benefits schedule would be distributed by mail, because the program change involved was very
simple and could be communicated clearly and concisely in written form. Furthermore, the
mechanism established ensured that selected claimants received the information quickly and it
minimized contamination of the control sample by removing treatment enrollment interviews
from the job service centers (JSCs).
Usually in experimental evaluations of employment program changes the issue of
participation must be carefully considered in designing the impact estimation plan. This is not
the case for the present experiment. Treatment assigned claimants were informed by mail, and
needed to do nothing other than standard program procedures. They were automatically
included in the experiment. Indeed the information sheet says,
You do not need to do anything different while claiming benefits. If you report
earnings, the computer will automatically use the new formula. Continue to
follow the instructions you were given when you filed your claim.
Using the mail and telephone allowed the central office to closely monitor the
enrollment process and guarantee that the required experimental conditions were repeated
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consistently. This also reduced the burden on local job service centers, thereby controlling
administrative costs for the experiment. Appendix C to this report presents ill Circular 13-94
which informed Job Service Center (JSC) staff around the State about the Earnings Deduction
Project. For maintaining experimental integrity, the most important information
communicated in this circular appeared on page 3 where the following two instructions were
stated:
A claimant cannot volunteer for the Earnings Deduction Project. If the claimant
asks, he or she should be told that the selection for the project is being dQne by
computer on a random basis.
Information about the project should not be given to claimants at the initial
claim filing.
3. Tests for Randomization
As stated in the previous section, randomization was done using the last two digits of
each claimant's Social Security Number because these digits are randomly assigned. It is
expected that this process will result in treatment and control groups which have the same
average characteristics.
The appeal of classically designed field experiments with large samples of treatment
and control subjects is that differences in outcome measures can be attributed to the
experimental treatment, since on average the groups are observationally the same except that
one group is exposed to the treatment.
The fIrst step in the evaluation process is to check if in fact the process specified to
generate random samples did in fact achieve that end.
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Table 1 lists a variety of exogenous characteristics observed for ill claimants in the
sample. The sample includes 278,982 individuals of whom 209,629 were treatment assigned
and 69,353 were control assigned. This number is everyone who claimed and qualified for ill
benefits -in Washington State between the fIrst week of October 1994 and the frrst week of
October 1995, except people who filed interstate or shared work claims. This sample size is
slightly larger than that ultimately used to compute the treatment impact estimates. Some
observations where excluded during the data correction phase. The larger sample allows a
more general test of the success in randomization. The slightly reduced and corrected sample
was retested for randomization. Those results are presented at the beginning of Section 9
which gives fmdings of the subgroup analysis.
Table 1 reports the mean value of the control group and tests for differences between
the treatment and control group on the following exogenous characteristics: age, gender, race
(4 subgroups), education (8 subgroups), veteran (3 subgroups), standby status, union status,
combined wage claim status, temporary disability status, reason for separation-lack of work;
weekly benefit amount (WBA), at minimum WBA, at maximum WBA, maximum benefits
payable on the claim, entitled weeks of benefits, job service center (JSC) where the claim was
filed (42 subgroups), industry (11 subgroups), private employer, government employer, and
occupation (10 subgroups)
All totaled there were treatment-control difference tests performed on 92 factors.
Among these there were significant differences in only 8 factors when testing at the 10 percent
level of significance. Observing 8 significant differences among 92 factors is well within the
acceptable range of what might be generated by a random process. The treatment group is
slightly less male (0.4 percent) than would be expected, slightly more likely to be at the
minimum WBA (0.1 percent), has slightly more entitled weeks of benefits (0.04 weeks), is
somewhat more from Auburn (0.4 percent), slightly less from Okanogan County (0.1
percent), slightly more likely to work in public administration (0.1 percent), and slightly more
likely to be employed by a government agency (0.2 percent).
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Among the significant differences, the most surprising result is on gender where the
treatment group is slightly more female. However this could have easily happened by chance,
and tests for an omitted variable in estimating unadjusted treatment impacts indicated that the
difference between treatment and control groups in gender was too small to affect the
estimates. It can safely be concluded that random assignment to treatment and control groups
was achieved in the experiment.
4. A Structure for Reviewing Results
As stated in the introduction, the aim of the experimental treatment was to "encourage
workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits to seek employment opportunities and
return to full-time employment with the result that the unemployment insurance trust fund is
positively affected." Therefore in doing the evaluation of the ill earnings deduction
experiment the focus was on the outcome measures: weeks of UI claimed, weeks claimed with
earnings, weeks compensated, dollars of compensation, earnings reported on continued claims
forms, and exhaustion of the ill benefit entitlement.
The Washington ill payment system works as follows: once a claimant submits an
application for a UI benefit claim, they begin a 52 week benefit year. The claimant may
submit a claim form for any week in the benefit year. If the claimant has earnings during a
week for which benefits are claimed they are to report their earnings on a continued claim
form. A copy of the standard continued claim form appears in Appendix D together with the
standard earnings deduction chart. On the front of the continued claim form, item 5 asks,
"Did you work [during weeks claimed as unemployed]?" (If yes enter amount earned before
deductions even if payment has not yet been received and complete the box below).
Figure 2 summarizes the relations between important outcomes examined in this study.
The figure is arranged as a type of flow chart with the fITst action being weeks claimed
It is important to know if the treatment has an effect on we regardless of eligibility.
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is then restricted to weeks claimed ofUI with no payment stops (WCNS). Payment
stops-which mean UI benefits cannot be paid--may be placed on a claim for a variety of
reasons relating to either job separation issues or failure to satisfy continuing eligibility rules
such as able, available, and actively seeking work. The relationship between WC and WeNS
will indicate if the treatment affects claims without regard to payment stops.
From WCNS the flow in Figure 2 is either left to weeks claimed with earnings
reported (WCE) or right to weeks claimed with no earnings reported (WCNE). Below each of
these concepts we have indicators of weeks claimed with UI paid, all weeks examined in this
third tier of Figure 2 have no payment stops, so the only reason a claim would not be paid is
for excess earnings. On the right the flow from WCNE down to weeks claimed of UI with no
earnings reported and a UI payment is complete. On the left WCE results in either weeks
claimed of UI with earnings reported and a UI payment (WCEUI) if reported earnings are low
enough, or weeks claimed of UI with earnings reported and no UI payment (WCENUI) if
reported earnings are too high. Together WCEDI and WCNEUI combine to yield weeks
claimed with a UI payment (WCill). From the weeks claimed with a UI payment results the
dollars of UI payments. The flow on the left is ill benefit payments received in weeks with
earnings (UIWE) and on the right is ill benefit payments received in weeks with no earnings
(UlWNE). Combined these two amounts yield UI benefits received in total (UITOTAL).
Other related outcomes of interest are the dollars of earnings reported on continued
claim forms during weeks claimed, the full time equivalent weeks of benefits paid
(FTEWEEKS = UITOTAL/(Weekly Benefit Amount», and the benefit exhaustion rate.
5. Basic Treatment Impact Estimates
Extensive validation and correction of the preliminary data set resulted in a final
analytic sample totaling 278,055 including 69,105 treatment assigned claimants and 208,950
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IWV............." .. assigned claimants. Results given in the remainder of this report were computed on
sample.
Results of the randomization tests suggest that reliable treatment impacts can be
estimated simply by computing differences in mean outcomes between treatment and control
groups. Tests revealed that unadjusted treatment impacts were not biased by omitting variables
found to have significant differences in tests of randomization. In particular, auxiliary
equations revealed neither gender nor government employer to be significant omitted variables.
5.1 Benefit Year Results
Figure 3 summarizes the impact estimates on the essential outcomes over the benefit
year. Figure 3 is structured just as Figure 2 to reveal the interrelations between the outcome
variables. In each cell of the figure on the left hand side is given the control group mean for
the variable and on the right hand side is given the treatment impact computed as treatment
minus control so that a positive value means that the treatment group exceeds the control group
and a negative value means the opposite. To indicate statistical significance, t-statistics are
given in parentheses below treatment impact estimates. At frrst glance we see that except for
weeks claimed and dollars of compensation with no earnings, treatment impacts are significant.
For weeks claimed (WC) the control group mean is 16.51 weeks and the treatment
group claimed 0.39 weeks more. Considering only weeks with no stops (WCNS), the
comparison group claimed 16.18 weeks and the treatment impact was 0.34. So that the
treatment induced an increase of over one-third of a week in weeks claimed. For weeks
claimed with no earnings (WCNE) 11.66 weeks were claimed by control group members and
there was no treatment impact on weeks with no earnings. Among weeks claimed with
earnings (WeE) 3.68 weeks were claimed by control group members and there was a
significant treatment impact of 0.36 weeks. The treatment impact on weeks claimed translated
entirely into weeks claimed with earnings.
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Among the weeks claimed with earnings (WCE), for the control group a slim majority
of weeks claimed had earnings too high to qualify for a ill benefit payment. For the treatment
group, the impact was 0.57 on weeks with earnings low enough to qualify for a ill benefit
payment (WCEUI) and -0.20 weeks when earnings were too high (WCENUl). This pattern
suggests that treatment assigned claimants had a clear understanding of the rules in effect.
Treatment subjects claimed more weeks when they had earnings low enough to allow
qualification for a UI benefit payment. Furthermore, treatment assigned beneficiaries claimed
fewer weeks when earnings were too high to qualify for a benefit payment.
For total weeks with some compensation (WCUI), the control group collected 13.41
weeks and the treatment group collected a benefit in an additional 0.54 weeks. Not
surprisingly, the treatment impact on benefits also came in weeks when earnings were
reported. The total benefit year compensation (UlTOTAL) for control group members
averaged $2,731 with a treatment impact of $67. The bulk of this impact, $65, came in weeks
with earnings (UIWE).
The more liberal earnings deduction formula, apparently acted to increase work effort,
but did not reduce overall benefit receipt and did not induce a quicker return to regular full
time work.
5.2 Deadweight Cost and Behavioral Response
If there were no behavioral response to the treatment offer of a more generous earnings
deduction formula, as represented by the shift from the existing system to the alternative
system in Figure 1, beneficiaries would automatically receive larger benefit checks without
doing a thing. These additional payments which result from the program change with no
behavioral change can be called «deadweight cost." The treatment impacts estimated above
can be decomposed into two parts: the deadweight cost and the behavioral response.
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The deadweight cost can be estimated on the control group simply by imposing the new
earnings deduction fonnula on the data for the control group and comparing the results on
certain outcomes to the actual control group means. Table 2 presents estimates for the five
outcomes which are affected by this computation together with total benefit year estimates of
impact for some other outcomes of interest. What happens is that 0.33 weeks claimed with
earnings which were not compensable under the control earnings deduction fonnula become
.compensable under the treatment earnings deduction fonnula. Therefore, $39 of the treatment
impact on total VI dollars paid in the benefit year are deadweight costs for the experimental
program.
The behavioral response can be computed by considering the control group with the
. simulated treatment earnings deduction fonnula and deducting the mean outcome variables for
this group from the treatment group. Again only five outcome variables are affected in this
exercise. The control means reported are for the control group.assuming the treatment
earnings deduction fonnula. The treatment impacts reported in Table 2 are the difference
between these control means and the actual treatment means. The estimates suggest that the
pure effect of the treatment is to increase the weeks claimed with earnings by 0.37 weeks with
0.24 weeks having earnings low enough to qualify for a VI benefit payment. The additional
weeks with a claim and reported earnings resulted in a mean $28 extra benefits paid.
In sUJ.IUiJ.ary, both the "deadweight cost" and the behavioral response contribute to
additional UI benefit payments from the ill trust fund. It was known before the experiment
that the deadweight cost would add to benefit costs, but it was hoped that the behavioral
response would operate in the opposite direction and dominate the deadweight cost.
Unfortunately this did not happen.
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5.3 Aggregate Cost of Proposed Earnings Deduction Fonnula
Given the treatment· impact estimates reviewed above on a per claimant basis, it is
possible to estimate aggregate costs of the program change which was tested. Table 3 presents
such estimates.
In the first row of Table 3 the mean ill benefits per treatment assigned beneficlal:y are
multiplied by the treatment sample size to yield the total payments to treatment group
members. The second row gives the computation for control group members. The third row
shows that given the treatment impact of $67, the cost of additional ill payments during the
experiment was $4.6 million or 0.61 percent of all benefits paid. Additionally, it is estimated
that $2.7 million or 0.35 percent of all benefits paid were deadweight costs of the treatment
while $1.9 million or 0.25 percent were due to the behavioral response.
Table 4 answers the question, "what would benefit payments have been during the
twelve month period if the more liberal earnings deduction formula were implemented state
wide, and what would be the additional cost over the existing fonnula?" As the table shows,
statewide implementation of the fonnula would have cost ail additional $18.5 million or four
times the cost of randomly offering the experimental program to 25 percent of beneficiaries.
6. First Spell Impact Estimates
For purposes of the following analysis, the frrst spell of unemployment benefit receipt
during the benefit year is defmed as starting when waiting week credit is earned and continuing
until the frrst week in which no DI compensation is granted.s Figure 4 presents frrst spell
SNo benefits are paid during the waiting week which is the fIrst week in the benefit year during which a
claimant is fully qualified for compensation. In the computations, the first spell is not abbreviated by the presence
of payment stops.
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control means and treatment impacts on the outcome measures displayed in the fashion of the
earlier flow chart presentations.
The control group mean weeks claimed (WC) was 10.31 weeks and the treatment
impact was 0.38 weeks. The control group weeks claimed with no payment stops (WCNS)
was 9.47 weeks and the treatment impact was 0.37 weeks. For these two outcomes, compared
to the benefit year results given in Figure 3, the control group means are about 6 weeks less,
but the treatment impacts are nearly identical to the benefit year treatment impacts for the same
outcome measures. A similar pattern holds up for other outcome measures.
For weeks claimed with earnings (WCE) the control group mean was nearly three
weeks lower than over the full benefit year, but the treatment impact was very similar at 0.31
weeks. The biggest difference in treatment impacts between frrst spell and benefit year
examination of outcomes was in the qualification for benefits among weeks claimed with
earnings. In the frrst spell, control and treatment subjects reporting earnings on continued
claim forms were denied benefits at about the same rate (WCENUI). Over the benefit year
treatment subjects were denied benefits based on the level of earnings reported in 0.2 fewer
weeks (WCENUI). This suggests that sometime after the frrst break in their payment series,
treatment assigned beneficiaries improved their understanding of the special earnings deduction
formula and took advantage. The break in the spell suggests that this additional knowledge
was probably associated with some full time work experience.
To provide a comparison of important outcome variables over the benefit year and the
frrst spell, Table 5 is provided. This table also provides a clear summary of the decomposition
of treatment impacts into the "deadweight cost" and the behavioral response. In this table also
displayed. are additional outcome measures which may be of interest. Full time equivalent
weeks of ill compensation (FTEWEEKS = UITOTALIWBA) is given along with the
exhaustion rate (EXHAUST) which is the proportion of beneficiaries who draw all of their
available ill benefits.
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For the variable FTEWEEKS we see a mean for the control group in comparison to
WCUI which is more than a full week smaller, and a treatment impact which is half as large.
This is natural since the treatment operates to induce extra earnings, or at least extra reporting
of earnings, the amount of compensation for any week claimed is only a fraction of the full
weekly benefit amount (WBA). A similar downward scaling also occurs for the deadweight
cost and the behavioral response on FTEWEEKS compared to WCUI. For FTEWEEKS the
treatment impact over the benefit year of 0.28 weeks is indistinguishable from the frrst spell
impact of 0.25 weeks. The bulk of the effect of the treatment seems to occur in the frrst spell.
This view is reinforced by the evidence on the exhaustion rate variable EXHAUST. Over the
benefit year the treatment impact induces a 0.6 percentage point increase in the exhaustion
rate, and two-thirds of that occurs in the frrst spell.
7. Estimated Impacts on Earnings
Outside of the treatment impact on weeks with a ur benefit payment and dollars of UI
benefits paid, the most important impact of the treatment which was designed to induce
beneficiaries to return faster to full time work by making part time work more appealing, is the
impact on earnings. Earnings impacts are reported in Table 6 using data from several sources.
The frrst row of Table 6 lists the mean total earnings reported on continued claim forms
by beneficiaries during their benefit year.6 The treatment mean earnings reported of $1,317
exceed control mean earnings by a statistically significant $99. Furthermore, two-thirds of this
difference occurs in the fIrst spell of insured unemployment?
6A copy of the continued claim form appears in Appendix D. On this form claimants report earnings
during a week claimed in answer to question 5.
7The frrst spell of insured unemployment is defmed to begin when waiting week credit is earned and end
the frrst subsequent week in which there is no DI compensation.
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The third row of Table 6 provides another source of information on ~~ ....n~n,""n rl1l'1~ .........
v\,;,LI."".......... year, this information is from quarterly wage records based on employer T'~Y'\."".......
payments. This information is regularly gathered by the Washington State ~mlpl(J.vmlent
Security Department to form the basis for employer quarterly ill tax. bills, and is used to
assess eligibility for ill benefits when claimants frrst file. Naturally, the totals are far greater
than the amounts reported on continued claim forms since wage records include earnings of
workers who have returned to full time work and not continued to make weekly benefit claims.
By this measure, there appears to be no statistically significant difference between benefit year
earnings of treatment and control group members. This suggests that the treatment impact
observed in earnings listed on continued claim forms may be simply a reporting phenomenon
rathe~ than evidence of a real change in economic behavior. It may be the case that claimants
are more willing to report on their earning activity while drawing benefits because of the more
generous deduction formula. Alternatively, being treatment assigned may make claimants
comply better with the reporting requirement since they believe that their earning activity is
being more closely monitored and therefore the risk of being caught under-reporting earnings
is greater.
As a further check to see if there could be some other explanation for the differences in
earnings reported, the fourth row of Table 6 reports on the earnings of treatment and control
group members prior to filing for ill benefits. Base period earnings are the' income used to
help determine the amount and duration of ill benefit entitlement for claimants. As for
earnings based on the benefit year wage records, the base period earnings are not statistically
different between the treatment and control groups. This is further evidence to suggest that the
statistically significant gain in earnings observed through reports on continued claim forms
might not be evidence of added productivity, but rather only an indication of more faithful
compliance with earnings reporting requirements for claimants.
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8. Timing of Treatment Impacts
It is also useful to consider the impact of the treatment on the time pattern of frrst
earnings reported on a continued claim fonn and the stopping of ill benefit receipt. To
understand these time patterns of behavior conditional exit rates are examined for each week in
the benefit year. The exit rate is computed by dividing the number of ill claimants who
changed their behavior during a given time period by the number of claimants in the group at
the start of that time period. Letting h (t) denote the conditional exit rate in time period t, and
Rt the number of ill claimants at the start of time period t, then h(t) = ~ - Rt+1)IRt, is a
conditional measure of a change in behavior because it depends on the number of ill claimants
who had yet to change their behavior regarding the outcome at the start of each time period
(Rt}.8 The number of claimants at the start of each time period (~) is called the "risk set"
because it is the number of workers "at risk" of changing behavior in the subsequent week.
Note that in the following tables it is always the case that the risk set in time period t+1 equals
the risk set in the previous period times one minus the exit rate for that period
[Rt+1 = Rt (1 - h(t»].
Exit rates presented in Table 7 are calculated beginning from the week of claiming
benefits and continuing for each of the 52 weeks in each claimants benefit year. The initial
risk sets are equal to the full analytic sample sizes, for the treatment group the initial risk set is
69,105 and for the control group the initial risk set is 208,950. Table 7 is based on the largest
possible initial risk sets, no ex ante exclusions were imposed before the computations were
done. The change in behavior examined is an approximation to the frrst week in the benefit
year when claimants had earnings. Earnings were assumed to occur if either they were
reported on a continued claim fonn or benefit receipt stopped. Claimants who never received
credit for having served a waiting week during their benefit year were assumed to exit ill with
earnings in the frrst week.
8The expression h(t) is the popular Kaplan-Meier exit rate.
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Table 7 indicates that during the fIrst week of the benefit claim 18,100 treatment
assigned claimants or 26.2 percent reported earnings, exited UI, or never earned a waiting
week compared with 54,407 or 26 percent in the control group. The procedure to infonn
claimants that they were treatment assigned, as outlined in Section 2 ensured they would know
by the end of the second week of their claim. It can be seen that in the third week there is a
statistically significantly.higher rate of exit to earnings for treatment assigned claimants
compared to those in the control group. While not usually statistically significant, the
treatment effect is non-negative up to the tenth week in the benefit year. By the end of the
benefit year, the treatment appeared to weakly induce a greater rate of exit to earnings.
The results presented in Table 7 are interesting because the risk sets considered are
very inclusive, however the outcome measure is vaguely defmed and mostly identified by
inference rather than observation. Tables 8 and 9 present hazard estimates focused on an
initial risk set restricted to claimants who received credit for having served a waiting week.
Rather than simply opening a benefit year, this means that there was actually a claim for at
least one week of compensation. Furthermore the results presented in Tables 8 and 9 are
restricted to the fIrst spell of the benefit year. That is, the weeks following the waiting week
until there is a week not claimed and not compensated. This is the same concept used to defme
the fIrst spell discussed in Section 6 of this report.
Table 8 summarizes the pattern of fIrst earnings reported on the continued claim. fonn
following the waiting week. Using the more precise defmition of the risk set and outcome
measure, the treatment response is observed to be much sharper. There is a statistically
significant higher proportion of treatment assigned claimants fIrst reporting earnings on the
continued claim form in the waiting week and in 17 out of the next 18 weeks. Overall the
cumulative result is that 4.55 percent more treatments than controls ever reported earnings on
their continued claim form in their first UI benefit spell starting with their waiting week.
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Table 9 summarizes the pattern of the fIrst exit from ill after receiving waiting week
credit. Exit from ill is defmed as happening the week preceding the fIrst week with no benefit
claim and compensation. The results present something of a mirror image to those presented
in Table 8. Table 9 shows that members of the control group tended to exit ill sooner than did
members of the treatment group. Indeed, the treatment impact is computed to be negative in
18 out of the fIrst 22 weeks following the waiting week. A possible explanation is that the
treatment offer of a more generous earnings deduction formula encourages beneficiaries to
maintain their attachment to the ill system in hopes of receiving at least a partial ill payment
during weeks of their benefit year.
9. Subgroup Analysis
There are two main reasons for examining treatment impacts by population subgroup.
One is to provide information to policy makers who may consider targeting a program to
certain groups, such as dislocated workers or older ill claimants. For example, it may be that
the ill system could be considered as a mechanism to administer a wage supplement to
dislocated workers. Another reason to examine subgroup effects is to identify possible biases
in the effects-a program that benefits only one gender or certain ethnic groups may not be
considered good policy even if it is cost effective.
This section reports on treatment impacts for 31 subgroups defmed by binary indicator
variables for 11 characteristics. The characteristics (with the number of subgroups following
in parentheses) is: gender (2), age (3), race/ethnicity (3), education (4), region of Washington
State (3), veteran status (3), union or standby work search exemption for ill (2), employer
government or private sector (2), industry (3), occupation (2), and ill base period earnings (4).
It is standard practice to examine program impacts by gender, age, race, occupation and
industry. Subgroups defined on the other characteristics were included from the rich
administrative data set to reveal the maximum possible information about the response to the
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trial program change. The huge sample size makes examination of the many subgroups a
practical possibility.
All subgroup treatment impacts were estimated simultaneously using a single regression
model. This means that the treatment response for each subgroup is estimated controlling for
the influence of all other subgroup characteristics. For example, the model estimates the
treatment impacts associated with being black controlling for the fact that blacks are less likely
to be in the highest base period earnings quartile and are more likely to have claimed benefits
in the Puget Sound region of Washington State. Continuing the example, if subgroup impacts
were not estimated in this way, any differential impact associated with being black might be a
result not of being black but rather of the other characteristics that blacks possess.9
Table 9 reports the mean values of the binary indicator variables for each subgroup
category examined for the separate treatment and control groups. The indicator variables take
the value of 1 if a claimant is in that group and 0 otherwise, so that the mean values indicate
the proportion in each subgroup of a category. This table presents information like that in
Table 1 which can be used to evaluate the homogeneity between treatment and control samples
and the success of random assignment. That is, tests of differences in characteristics between
the treatment and control groups are given. For the twenty independent subgroups (omitting
9The equation estimated for each outcome of interest was: Y = a + TB + GC + GTD' + u
where Y is the outcome measure (either weeks of insured unemployment, dollars of DI compensation, or the DI
benefit exhaustion rate), Tis the matrix of treatment dummies, G is the matrix of dummy variables which code
for membership in a subgroup, a is the intercept, B, C, and D are conformable parameter vectors, and u is a
normally distributed random error term with mean of zero. The equation specifies a complete one-way interaction
model-that is, all fIrst order products of subgroup dummy variables, and treatment indicators with each other are
included. This model allows simultaneous estimation of all subgroup treatment impacts, but imposes linear
restrictions on those estimates.
Treatment impacts for a particular subgroup are computed as the sum of the parameter estimated on the
product of the subgroup dummy variable and the treatment indicator added to the sum of estimates of parameters
on subgroup dummies interacted with treatment indicators multiplied by their respective population shares, Le. the
proportion of the population having that characteristic. In each computation, parameter estimates for the
complement to the subgroup of interest are omitted. For example, expressing population shares as the expected
value of the subgroup dummy variables, W(G), the subgroup impacts would be computed as B + Z'(G)D, where B
and D are the least squares estimates of B and D from the above equation.
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one from each category) there are significant differences for 4 at the 10 percent level of
significance. This is somewhat more differences than would be expected by a completely
random process, but as stated earlier omission of concomitant variables in estimating treatment
impacts did not bias results.
Subgroup analysis was performed on seven outcome variables, most of which were
introduced in Section 2 of this report. A complete set of impact estimates for all subgroup
categories is provided for each of the outcomes in separate tables. The subgroup impact
estimates reported in Tables 11 through 17 in order are for the outcomes: weeks- claimed
(We), weeks claimed with earnings (WeE), total VI compensation in the benefit year
(UITOTAL), full time equivalent weeks of VI benefits (FTEWEEKS = UITOTALIWeekly
Benefit Amount), VI benefit exhaustion rate (EXHAUST), total earnings declared on continued
claim forms during the benefit year (EARNINGS), and average weekly earnings reported on
continued claim forms (EARNWEEK). In Tables 11 to 17 tests are performed across
subgroups within each category on the control group to check if mean outcomes are different.
Tests are done between the bottom subgroup listed and every other subgroup in the category.
For every outcome, nearly all subgroup control means are significantly different from the
reference subgroup control mean. This indicates that the subgroup categories are well
specified to reveal differential behavior in response to the experimental treatment.
A summary of the subgroup treatment impact estimates on all 7 outcome measures is
given in Table 18. The most marked differences across subgroups within a category is in
race/ethnicity. Furthermore, while the subgroup treatment impact estimates are statistically
significant for blacks on only two of the seven outcome measures, it appears that among all
subgroups in all categories blacks exhibited the most favorable response to the more generous
earnings deduction formula. 1O Blacks assigned to the treatment tended to claim fewer weeks of
UI, have more weeks claimed with earnings reported, draw less in ill benefits, and be less
100nly two of the seven subgroup treatment impacts for blacks are statistically significant in spite of the
large sample of blacks. As shown in Table 11, the sample size for blacks is 10,747.
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likely to exhaust benefits than the white racial group, the outcomes for blacks are also
generally more favorable than for the Other racial group.
White. collar workers had a response which was statistically significantly different from
blue collar workers on four of the seven outcomes: weeks claimed, total ill compensation
received, full time equivalent weeks of compensation (UITOTALIWBA), and the ill
exhaustion rate. None of the subgroup treatment impacts on these outcomes for white collar
workers was statistically significant, but the direction of results was that treatment assigned
blue collar workers tended to claim more ill benefits, draw more ill benefits and be more
likely to exhaust their benefit entitlement.
Among education subgroups treatment assigned claimants with less than a high school
education were likely to increase weeks claimed, weeks claimed with earnings, and reported
earnings by significantly less than high school graduates and other educational attainment
groups. The most educated group tended to claim the most weeks, draw the most full time
equivalent weeks of benefits, and be most likely to exhaust ill benefits in response to the
treatment offer.
While treatment assigned claimants on union or standby work search exemptions tended
to claim about the same number of weeks and the same number of weeks with earnings as
those not exempt from search for union or standby reasons, those on union or standby tended
to report significantly higher part time earnings on continued claim forms.
Base period earnings (BPE) is claimant earnings in the four calendar quarters of the
period over which ill benefit eligibility and benefit amount are determined. BPE subgroups
were examined because of the suspicion that those with lower BPE are more likely to have a
history of regular work in part time and temporary jobs and may be more likely to take such
work in the future. The distribution of BPE was divided into quartiles and subgroups were
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formed on that basis. 11 While the treatment impacts on weeks claimed and weeks claimed with
earnings did not differ between the BPE subgroups, the total dollars of ill benefits drawn and
the dollars of earnings reported on continued claim forms was significantly different between
the two lower and the two higher BPE subgroups. Except for simple scaling of the dollar
amounts involved, the behavioral response of all four BPE quartile subgroups to the treatment
is remarkably uniform.
The subgroup analysis is the first place in this report where treatment impact estimates
on average earnings reported in weeks with earnings is given. While the treatment impact on
total earnings reported on continued claim forms in the benefit year is positive for every single
subgroup, the treatment impact on average earnings reported in weeks with earnings is almost
uniformly negative. While the latter impact estimates are almost never statistically significant,
combined with the impact on reported earnings the result suggests that treatment assigned
subjects accepted slightly lower paying jobs to get back to work quickly.
Very few of the remaining subgroup treatment impacts were significantly different from
those for reference groups on any of the outcome measures examined. The impact on weeks
claimed with earnings by males was somewhat lower than for females, but still positive. Other
veterans had the highest treatment impact on weeks claimed among any group with the impact
estimate statistically significantly greater than for Vietnam veterans and non-veterans.
Vietnam veterans had the greatest treatment impact on average earnings per week.
While several of the cross subgroup differences within categories are not statistically
significant, the tendencies in the categories of subgroups are that the treatment tends to induce
the greatest increase in weeks claimed and full time equivalent weeks of compensation among
those in the following groups: female, service industry, the Other race group, high educational
attainment level, the Puget Sound region of Washington, Vietnam veteran status, working for a
l1The four base period earnings (BPE) groups were partitioned with BPE at $7,446, $13,773, and
$23,086.
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private sector employer, working in a blue collar occupation. More simply put, no clear
demographic pattern of response emerges.
10. Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Earnings Deduction Experiment
This section provides a concise benefit-cost analysis of the Washington State ill
Earnings Deduction Experiment. The analysis is conducted from four different perspectives:
the ill System, federal and State government taken as a whole, the State government of
Washington, and total society. A summary of the per beneficiary benefit-cost analysis is
presented in Table 19.
The net benefit of an action is the difference between all benefits (B) and all costs (C),
B - C, associated with the action. Net benefits is useful concept since it helps in examining the
important social welfare principle offered by Nicholas Kaldor. The Kaldor compensation
criterion suggests that all projects should be undertaken that have positive net benefits, since
the losers (those bearing the costs) could be paid off by the winners (those obtaining the
benefits) and leave a net surplus .12 For the present problem of assessing the value of the
change in the earnings deduction formula, net benefits are examined on a per beneficiary basis.
10.1 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of the ill System
The main expected benefit to the Washington State ill system of the proposed program
change was the hoped for reduction in ill compensation payments that would have resulted
from a more rapid return to regular full time work by beneficiaries offered the more generous
earnings deduction formula. A reduction in benefit payments would be a positive benefit to the
ill system. However, an increase in benefit payments would be a negative benefit. Since
treatment assigned claimants drew a mean $67 more in ill benefits over the benefit year than
12As defmed in Henderson and Quandt (1971, p. 279).
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did control group members, the benefit to the State ill system of the change in the formula is
estimated to be -$67.
The main cost to the state of the program change is the administrative cost of the
program. If the experimental intervention were actually adopted, there would be a one time
conversion cost to reprint claimant rights booklets, which include the different earnings
deduction table, and to reprogram a few statements in the benefit computation computers.
However, the additional ongoing regular administrative cost would be zero. There would be
no recurring costs beyond what is currently experienced for handling claims with reported
earnings. There were some one time administrative costs associated with conducting the
experiment, but these would not be part of an ongoing program. If the program change
induced additional entry to the UI system by claimants who will claim partial benefits, then the
average administrative burden would increase. Still, the added administrative cost would be
quite low as it is mainly the cost of key entering earnings reported on continued claim forms.
Therefore as shown in Table 19, the net benefit to the Washington State UI system of
the change in the UI earnings deduction formula is estimated to be -$67 per beneficiary.
10.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of all Government
As can be seen in Table 19, the net benefit of the program change to all government is
estimated to be more favorable than for the ill system alone, because the government has
another source of benefits, namely the additional taxes that are collected because of the
additional earnings by the claimants responding to the bonus offer.
While Washington State does not have an income tax, there is a State sales tax of 8
percent. Presuming that the marginal propensity to consume out of unemployment
compensation income is nearly 1, the state can expect to receive in sales tax collections very
close to 8 percent of any increase in disposable income among UI beneficiaries.
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Assume that the lowest federal tax rate of 15 percent applies to the typical ill
beneficiary's compensation. This assumption is reasonable as it was made by the State of
Washington which, beginning January 1, 1997, offers ill beneficiaries the possibility of
withholding 15 percent of their ill compensation for future payment of federal taxes. In
determining net disposable income, payroll taxes, such as FICA, are not considered because
these represent obligations on the part of the federal government for future payments, and
therefore do not constitute unencumbered new revenue to the government.
Given that reported earnings over the benefit year increased by an estimated $99 per
treatment assigned beneficiary, federal tax revenue will increase about $15 per beneficiary, and
Washington State sales tax revenue would increase by about $7. Combined with the negative
benefit due to increased UI payments and the zero administrative costs, per beneficiary net
benefits to all government are -$45.
10.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of the Washington State Government
The net benefit of the program change to Washington State government is estimated to
be somewhat less than that for all government. This is because of the leakage of tax revenue to
the federal government.
With the estimated earnings increase of $99 per treatment assigned beneficiary,
Washington State sales tax revenue would increase by about $7. Combined with the negative
benefit due to increased ill payments and the zero administrative costs, per beneficiary net
benefits to all government are estimated to be -$60.
10.4 Benefit-Cost Analysis from the Perspective of Total Society
The net benefit to total society is the sum of all benefits and costs to the individuals that
comprise the society. In computing net benefits to total society, transfer payments net·out to
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zero, since they are benefits to the recipients and costs to the tax payers. Thus, ill
compensation payments are irrelevant in computing benefits or costs to total society. For there
to be a net benefit to total society, there must be an increase in real income greater than the
real costs· incurred to produce that income.
For the change in the earnings deduction formula, the associated increase in real
income is represented by the increase in earnings of those given the more generous formula.
The real costs incurred to produce that additional income are the administrative costs of the
program and the value of leisure foregone by the claimants. Unfortunately, there is no reliable
way to place a value on the foregone leisure. Since the calculation of benefits to society does
not include an estimate of this value, the estimate presented in Table 19 must be regarded as an
.overstatement of true societal benefits.
There are two critical assumptions in these calculations. The fIrst is that the value of
foregone leisure is zero. Since this is unlikely to be the case, our estimate of net benefits is
overstated by an unknown amount. 13
Another assumption involved in computing the social net benefits estimate is that there
is no displacement of persons not offered the more generous earnings deduction formula. If
the gain in earnings of treatment assigned claimants was due in any part to a reduction in
earnings by ill beneficiaries not offered the new formula or a reduction in earnings by workers
not involved with the ill system, an adjustment would have to be deducted from the gain in
13At the extreme, the foregone leisure equals the additional income, reducing societal net benefits to zero.
This would be the case only in equilibrium in a perfectly competitive society, with perfect information. At a
minimum, it may be accepted that job market information is imperfect. Therefore, individuals can increase their
job search and acquire jobs sooner, thereby reducing the length of unemployment (even if voluntary), and
surrender leisure and UI compensation valued at less than the additional earnings. Greenberg (1997) who provides
a methodology to adjust for the value of forgone leisure when doing benefit-cost analysis of employment and
training programs asserts that the importance of the adjustment is greater where the program induces a change in
hours worked rather than a change in the wage rate. Since the main aim of the present intervention is to increase
hours of work the social net benefit computation which fails to adjust for foregone leisure is likely to appreciably
overstate net benefits.
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earnings of treatment assigned beneficiaries to arrive at the social benefits of the program
change. Although there is no direct evidence regarding displacement, the theoretical work of
Davidson and Woodbury (1990, p. 18) suggest that on balance, there shouldn't be any
displacement. The essential argument against displacement is that increased productivity by
those who are now working more improves the performance of the economy by creating new
jobs, and these new jobs eventually produce employment opportunities for other workers.
Since administrative costs of operating the proposed earnings deduction formula are
zero, from the perspective of total society the more generous earnings deduction formula
appears to yield substantial net benefits.
10.5 Summary of Benefit-Cost Analysis
The more generous earnings deduction formula appears to yield a net cost to the ill
system, to government as a whole, and to the State government of Washington, additional
revenue sources would be needed to fmance the program change.
A net benefit to society as a whole has been estimated, but there are many caveats on
this fmding. The value of foregone leisure has not been deducted, and the possibility of
displacement exists. Also, the impact on earnings was estimated using information reported by
beneficiaries on continued claims forms. As discussed earlier, this estimate of earnings impact
differs from that found with data from quarterly wage records for the benefit year. The
quarterly wage records suggest no earnings difference between treatment and control groups.
While there are time lags and other administrative reasons why the quarterly wage records
report lower than actual earnings for the period, these factors should equally affect records for
treatment and control group members. This suggests that the higher earnings observed on
continued claim forms by treatment assigned claimants may be simply a reporting phlenc.me~non
rather than evidence of actual additional economic output. Perhaps being in an eXJ)erJlll1~~nUll
treatment group induces beneficiaries to report more of their earnings since they
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state is more closely monitoring their employment activity, or it may be the case that the more
liberal earnings deduction formula simply encourages beneficiaries to be more forthright in
reporting income during their benefit year because they get to keep slightly more.
In summary, from most perspectives the more generous earnings deduction formula did
not yield net benefits, and while the net social benefit is computed to be positive this is based
on several tenuous assumptions.
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Passed Legislature - 1994 Regular Session
State of Washington53rd Legislature 1993. Regular Session
By Senator Vognild
·Read first time 02125/93.. Referred to Committee on Labor & Commerce.
AN ACT Relating to unemployment insurance 'deductions; creating new
sections; making'an appropriation; and providing an expiration date.
NE\V SECTION, Sec. 1. (1) The purpose of this act is to provide for a study which will
review incentives t.hat encourage workers receiving unemployment insurance
benefits to seek ·~,ploymentopportunities and return, to full-time employment
with the result ~he unemployment insurance trust fund is positively affected.
(2Xa) The employment security department shall undertake a pilot p~oject to determine the
effect of allowing unemployment insurance claimants to keep a greater portion of their weekly
benefits when -engaged in part-time or temporary employment, as provided in section 2 of this
~ct. The department shall develop a plan to implement the project, inc\uding the number of
participants and the criteria for participation in the project. The plan shall be reviewed and
approved by the unemployment insurance advisory ,committee before th~ pilot ·is implemented.
(bi The department shall report to the appropriate committees.of'the legislature on the pilot
project by December 31, 1996. The report shall include the impact on the unemplo~ent.
insurance trust fund and on claimants participating in the project. . «
NE\Y SECTION. Sec. 2. For the purpos~sof the pilot project created under section 1 of this
act, the fol1owihg requirements f9r defining "une.mployment" and level of unemployment
insurance benefit deductions is as follows: , .
(1)(a) An individual shall be deemed to be "unemployed" in any wee~ during which the
indiVidual performs no services and with respect to which no remuneration is payable to the
individual, or in any week of less than full time work, if the remuneration payable to the
individual with respect to such week is less than one and one-half times the individual's
weekly benefit amount plus fifteen dollars. The commissioner shall prescribe regulations
applicable to unemployed individuals making such distinctions in the procedures as to such
, types of unemployment as the commissioner deems necessary.
(bi An, individual shall be d~emed not to be "unemployed'" during any week which falls
totally w~thin a period during which the individual, pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement or individual employment contract, is employed full titlJ.e in accordance with a
definition of full time contained in the agreement or contract, and for which compensation for
full time work is payable, This subsection may not be applied retroactively to an individual
who had' no guarantee of work at the start of such period and subsequently is provided
additiona~ work ~y the employer; and
(2) If an eligible individual is' available for work for less than· a full week, he or she shall
be paid his 9r her weekly benefit amount reduced by one-seventh of such amount for each day
that he or she is unavailable for work. However, if he or she is unavailable for work for three
days or more of a week, he or she shall be considered unavailable for the entire .week.
Each eligible individual'who is unemployed in any week shall be paid with respect to such
week a benefit in an amount equal to his or her weekly benefit amount less sixty-six and two-
thirds percent of that part of the remuneration, if any, payable to him or her with respect to such
week which is in excess of fifteen dollars. Such benefit, if not a multiple of one' dollar, shall be
reduced to the next lower multiple of one dollar.
Sec. 3. RCW 50.24.014 and 1993 c 483 s 20 are each amended to read as follows:
!l..l.4U A separate and identifiable account to provide for the financing'of special programs to
assist the unemployed is established in the.administrative contingency fund. Contributions to
this account shall accrue and become payable by each employer, except employers as described
in RC\V 50.44.010 and 50.44.030 w~o have properly elected to make payments in lieu of .
contributions, taxable local gove~ment employers as described in ROW 50.44.035, and those
employers who are required. to make payments in lieu of.contributions, at a basic rate of two
one-hundredths of otJ.e percent. The amount of wages' subject to tax shall be determined under
ROW 50.24.010. . .
!hl ror the first calendar quarter of 1994 only, (this»~ basic. two one-hundredths of one
percent contribution payable under (a) of this subsection shall be increased by one-hundredth of
one percent to a total rate of three one-hundredths of one perc.ent. The .proceeds of this .
incremental one-hundredth of one percent shall be used solely for the purposes described in
section 22, chapter 483, Laws of 1993. and for the purposes described in section 1 of this act. Any
surplus fro1'n contributiOns payable under this subsection (b) will be deposited in the
unemployment compensation trust fund. .
12.lli!1 Contributions under this section shall become due and be paid by each employer under
rules as the commissioner may prescribe, and shall not be deducted, in whole or in part, from
the remuneration of individuals in the employ of the employer. Any deduction in violation of
this section is unlawful. . ,
!b1ln'the payment of any contributions under this section, a fractional part of a cent shall
be, disregarded unless it amounts to one-half cent or more, in which case it shall be increased to
one cent. .
!ID. If the commissioner determines that federal funding has been increased to provide .
financing for the services specified in, chapter 50.62 ROW, the commissioner shall.direct that
-collection of-contributions under this section be terminated on the following January 1st._
'NE\Y SECTION. Sec. 4. The s!J.m of four hundred thousand dollars, or as much thereof
as may be necessary, is appropriated for the biennium ending June 30, 1995, ·from the
unemploymen~insurance funds collected.under RC\V 50.24.014(1)(b) to the .employm~ntsecurity
department for the purposes of section 1 of this act.· .
,NE\V SECTION. Se~ 5. Sections 1 and 2 of this act shall expire July 1, 1997.
. KE\V SECTION, Sec. 6. If any part of. this act is found to be in conflict with federal
requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state or the
eligibility of employers in this state for federal unemployment tax credits, the conflicting part
of this act is hereby declared: to be inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict, and such .
finding or determination shan not affect the operation of the remainder of this act. The. rules
under .this act sJ1all meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to t~e receipt
federal funds by the state or the granting of federal unemployment tax credits to employers
this state. .
-END-
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Appendix B
Earnings Deduction Project
Information Sheet
and
Earnings Deduction Project Chart

EARNINGS DEDUCTION PROJECT
Washington State Employment Security Department
UI Research. RO. Box 9046
Olympia, Washington 9850'1-9046
Dear Claimant:
The state legislature has asked the agency to study the effect of a
more generous earnings deduction formula. You have been r~ndom.ly
selected to be p~.ofthisone-year study:
When you work part-time and report your earnings, your benefits will
, be based on the new formula. As a result, your unemployment insur-
ance check will be slightly larger than for those not in the stud~
You do not need to ·do anything different while claiming benefits. If
you report earn.iD.gs, the computer will automatically use the new for-
mula. Continue to follow the instructions given to you when you filed
your claim. .
Enclosed is a new'Earnings Deduction Chart. You can use it to deter-
mine the amoutit of benefits you will receive ifworking part-time. It
shows the speci:fic formula and some examples ofhow to use the chart.
Reminder: YQu are not eligible for benefits ifyou work full-time. Also,
ifyou quit or are fired from a part-timejob, the agency must rule on the
job separation. the same way as if it was from a full-time job. (This is
the same as current law.)
Questions? Call 1·800·670·6782
-39-
PROJEOTO DE GANANCIAS Y DEDUCCIO~S
Washington State Employment Security DepartmeJ:1t
UI Research. P.O. Box 9046 .
Olympia, ~ashington98507·9046
Estimado Reclamante:
La legislatura estatal Ie a pedido a esta agencia estudiar los efectos de
una f6~ulamas generosa sobre las.ganancias y deducciones. Usted a
sido seleccionado (al azar) para ser parte de este estudio por un ano.
Cuando usted trabaja parte-tiempo y reporta sus ganancias, sus beneficios
se .basaran en el formulario nuevo. Como resultado su cheque de
asegurancia de desempleo 'Sera un poco mas grande de aquellos que no
estan en el estudio. .
Usted no tendra que hacer nada diferente' en cuento su reclamo. Si Ud.
reporta ga~ancias, la computadora automaticamente usara la nueva
formula. Continuar en seguir las instrucciones que se Ie dieron cuando
empezo au reclamo.
Adjunto se encuentra la nueva esquema de ganancias y deducciones. Usted
la puede usar para determinar la cantidad de beneficios que usted ~ecibira
si trabaja parte-tiempo. Le enseiia el f6rmulario especifico y tambien
algunos: ejemplos en como usar la esquema.
. .
Recuerde: Usted no tiene derecho a recibir beneficios si trabaja tiempo
completo. Tambien, si usted deja su empleo 0 es despedido de un trabajo
que es parte-tiempo, La agencia tiene que hacer una decisi6n sobre La
separacion de trabajo en'el mis'TJ1,O modo si fuera trabajo par tiempo
completo.
l,Preguntas? Llame all·800·670·6732 *
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Attachment C
TheEarnings Deduction Project Chartshowsyou howtofiguretheamountofyourearningsdeduction. When your earnings deduction is equal
to or is more than your weekly benefit amount you are not eligible for benefit payments for the week.
Below are example situations showing you how to use the Earnings Deduction Project Chart.
Example 1: Ms. Smtth is eligible for $200 aweek on unemployment. During the week claimed, she earned $149.50 from part time work and report~
the earnings on her weekly claim form.
To determine the amount we would deduct from Ms. Smtth's weekly unemployment benefits, go to the earnings deduction chart and fina
$149.50.· ~f._
$147.02 and 148.52 This is the amount we would deduct from
148.52 and 150.01 90 ~ M S 'thl kl be fit150,02 and 151.51 s. ml swee y ne s.
Based on the earnings deduction computation from the chart, $90 is deductible from Ms. Smtth's weekly unemployment benefits. Ms
Smith is eligible for benefits of $110 for the week.
Example 2:
This is the amount we would deduct from
1}4-- Mr. Jone's weekly benefits.
Appendix C
Earnings Deduction Project
Information to Staff of
Job Service Centers in Washington State

State ofWashington
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT
UIPolicy
September 20, 1994
UI CmCULAR 18-94
SUBJECT: EARNINGS DEDUCTION PROJECT
Purpose. '1b proyide JSCs with information and instructions regarding the Earnings
Deduction Project.
'Background. A claimant working less than full time may be eligible for partial bep.efits.
Eligibility depends upon the claimant's weekly benefit amount (WBA) and the amount of his or
her gross weekly earnings. Under the current deduction formula provided in RCW 50.20.130,
the fIrSt $5 ofthe claimant's gross pay is disregar~~dand 15% ofthe remaining amount of
earnings is deducted fn?m the claimant's WBA. When the earnings deduction equals the WBA,
the claimant is not ~ligible for benefits for the week. .
The 1994 legislature passed Engrossed Senate Bill 5920 (Chapter 187, laws of1994) allocating funds to
our department for a study (Earnings DeductionProject) to test a more generous earnings deductiOn
fonnula (see attachmentA). For the stu~ the first $15ofthe claimant's gross earnings is disregarded
and66~%ofthe remaining amountofearnings is deducted from the claimant's WBA.
The purpose of the Earnings Deduction Project is to detennine whether a more generous
earnings deduction wouldenoourage more claimants to accept part-time or temporary work,
resulting in a savings to the Ul trust fund.
Originally, the study was to be limited to one or two JSCs. However, the w.~. Upjohn Institute
recommended the project be conducted on a statewide basis to provide a larger sampling of .
claims and more accurate results.
Final results of the study will be presented to the legislature by December 31, 1996.
~t'sNew? Starting October 3; 1994, the BenefitAutomated System (BAS) will randomly
select 25% ofall new claims filed with effective dates .between October 2, 1994 (BYE 39195) and
September 30, 1995 (BYE 37196). The selected claimants will be a part of the Treatment Group
using·th~more generouse~gsdeduction formula.
The remaining 75% will be a part of the Control Group against which the treatment group will
be compared. They will continue to receive the normal earnings deduction.
Shared Work (JSC 980) and Interstate (JSC 990) claims are excluded from the selection. They
will continue" to receive the nonna! earnings deduction as spelled out in ROW 50.20.130:
• Whether the initial claim is valid or invalid, all claimants selected to the tfreatment Group will
be mailed an infonnational packet after the initial claim BAS run. The packet consists ofan
advisory notice and a project Earnings Deduction'C~ (see attaclunents B and C).
Ifan invalid claim later becomes valid because of a late wage report, redetennination, ewe,
.etc., the claimant will be mailed another infonnational packet.
-45-
UI CmCULAR 18-94
September 20, 1994
Page 2
• A claimant selected to the Treatment Group who later requests and is granted back date of
his or her claim. to a week prior to October 2, 1994 will remain a part of the Treatment
Group even if the new benefit year is prior to 39/95.
• A new "Earnings Pilot" field has been added to the B04 sCreen (see',attaclunent D).
- Claimants in the 'Ireatment Group using the more generous deduction formula will be
identified on the field with a: tTt indicator.
- Claimants in the Control Group will be identified in th~ field With a "e" ~dicator.
•. Shared Work (JSC 9~O) and Interstate (JSC 990) ~aiIJ:).:~~are excluded from the
study and will be identified on the field with a "N" indicator~ ,'"
- If the "Earnings Pilot" field is blank, the initial claim was filed"' prior to October 2, 1994.
These claimants are not in the project. .
• The earnings reported by claimants in the Treatment Group''Will' be identified with an
asterisk (*) after the earnings amount on the .B03 screen (see attachment E).
• All trackingofthe Earnings Deduction Project related activities will'oo'done by Central Office stan:
Job Service CenterAction. JSC staffshould continue to accept and process b;ritial claims in
the usual manner. No'special JSC action is required except when assessing overpayments for
claimants With earnings or when issuing supplemental payments for claimants who have
underreparted their earnings.
When assessing an overpayment based on earnings or when making supplemental payments
.because ofunderreported earnings, JSCs must.check the B04 and B03 screens to determine
whether the claimant is in the 'Ireatment Group (checking for the T iIidicator and asterisk (*)
after the earnings amount). .
-,
• For claimants with a "Ttf indicator, use the project deduction formula'to determine the
overpayment or underpayment amounts.
If the deductible amount results in a reduction ofpayments for the week., use Chapter 187,
Laws of 1994, as the authority for the overpayment (rather than RCW 50.20.130). If the
claimant has excess earnings or is detennined "not unemployed" for the week, use
ROW 50.20.010 as the authority for the overpayment.
,Attachment F is the project Determination Notice and/or Overpayment Assessment (EMSX
ED Project) for claimants in the Treatment Group. Under separate cover, you will receive a
supply of the forms. Ifyou need more, contact Ul Policy, SCAN 234-5131 (OffSCAN 753).
• For claimants with a "0," "N" or with no indicator" use the current deduction formula and
procedures for assessing the overpayment.
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JSC staffneed to be aware of the following:
• A claimant cannot volunteer for the Eamings Deduction Project. Ifthe claimant asks, he or she
should be told that the selection for the project is done by the computer on a random basis. .'
• Infonnation about the project should not be given to claimants at initial claim filing.
• A claimant selected for the Treatment Group will remain a part of the Treatment Group for
.the d~tionof his or her claim. For example, a claimant in the Treatment Group who .
transfers to JSC 990 will remain a part of the 'Ireatment Group, even though JSC 990 is not
participating.
Under separate cover, we are sending you a supply of the Earnings Deduction Project charts
(EMSX Project Chart).. Please make the charts available to appropriate JSC staff. Also make
the charts available to Treatment Group claimants who are reopening their claims and/or have
misplaced the chart mailed to them with their packets. Ifyou need more, contact UI Policy,
SCAN 234-5131 (OffSCAN 753).
Any questions or concerns that a claimant has about the earnings project can be directed to a
toll-free project number:' 1-800-670-6732.
Inquiries. Please refer any qu~tio~ regarding this circular to Pat Remy, Earnings Deduction
Project, SCAN 366-2468 (OffSCAN 664). .
DALE M. ZIEGLER
Assistant Commissioner
Unemployment Insurance Division
DMZ:d9
Attachments
Distribution: "Special"
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILE MAINTENANCE
SUBJECT FILE: ur Circulars - Retain pending further instructions.
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Appendix·D
Standard Unemployment Insurance
Continued Claim Form and
Earnings Deduction Chart
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Figure 2. Washington UI Earnings Deduction Project
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Appendix F
TABLES

Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Sizeb
AGE Age in Years 36.38 0.040 0.82 278,820
GENDER Male = 1 0.64 -0.004* 1.81 179,002
WHITE Race, white = 1 0.80 0.002 1.12 223,392
BLACK Race, black= 1 0.038 0.001 1.10 10,747 .
HISPANIC Race, Hispanic = 1 0.103 -0.002 1.30 28,729
OTHER Race, other = 1 0.058 -0.001 1.14 16,114
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Sizeb
LTHS Education, less than 0.268 -0.003 1.46 74,640
high school = 1
HS Education, high 0.366 0.003 1.30 102,250
school =1
SOMECOLL Education, some 0.231 0.002 0.92 64,522
college =1
AAVOC Education, associates! 0.025 -0.001 0.81 6,841
voc certificate= 1
BACHELOR Education, bachelor 0.057 0.000 0.15 15,833
degree= 1
MASTERS Education, masters 0.012 -0.000 0.25 3,376
degree = 1
PHD Education, PhD 0.002 -0.000 1.08 509
degree = 1
GED Education, GED 0.040 -0.001 1.04 11,011
equivalent
aMean of treatment group minus mean of control group. A positive value indicates the treatment group mean is
greater.
bTotal sample size is 278,982 (209,629 controls and 69,353 treatments).
* Significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Table 1. Tests for Randomization Washington ill Earnings Deduction Experiment
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Table 1. (Continued)
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Sizeb
VETERAN . Veteran status, 1=yes 0.150 0.000 0.02 41,860
VIETNAM Vietnam veteran= 1 0.060 -0.001 0.06 16,685
OTHERVE Other veteran= 1 0.090 0.001 0.53 25,175
T
STANDBY On standby, 1=yes 0.214 -0.001 0.67 59,660
UNION Union hiring hall member, 0.096 0.000 0.16 26,796
l=yes
CWC Combined wage 0.064 -0.001 0.50 17,904
claim, 1=yes
TID Temporary total disability, 0.010 0.000 0.24 2,666
l=yes
LACK IC Separation, 0.736 -0.000 0.06 205,294
lack of work= 1
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Sizeb
WBA Weekly benefit amount 213.85 0.36 0.91 278,982
WBAMIN Minimum WBA, 1=yes 0.036 -0.001* 1.75 10,034
WBAMAX Maximum WBA, 1=yes 0.188 0.000 0.20 52,590
MBP Maximum Benefits 5707.75 15.48 1.21 278,982
Payable on Claim
ENTITLE Entitlement (weeks) 25.87 0.036* 1.79 278,982
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Sizeb
JSC310 Auburn 0.058 0.004** 3.48 16,500
JSC330 Renton 0.039 -0.001 1.53 10,867
JSC350 Lynnwood 0.037 0.000 0.10 10,288
JSC360 North Seattle 0.049 0.000 0.17 13,764
JSC370 Rainier 0.046 -0.001 1.02 12,690
JSC380 Everett 0.054 0.000 0.09 15,127
JSC390 Bellevue 0.048 0.000 0.18 ·13,525
JSC460 Renton - Boeing 0.004 0.000 0.73 1,219
JSC470 Everett - Boeing 0.002 0.000 1.38 597
JSC480 Renton/Grady 0.002 -0.000 0.47 587
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Table 1. (Continued)
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Groupa Difference Size
b
JSC520 Tacoma 0.039 0.000 0.48 10,825
JSC530 Lakewood 0.061 -0.001 0.68 17,052
JSC540 Bellingham 0.031 0.000 0.16 8,600
JSC550 Bremerton 0.033 -0.001 1.47 9,085
JSC560 Mount Vernon 0.033 0.001 0.93 9,209
JSC570 Port Angeles 0.009 -0.000 0.84 2,519
JSC571 Port Angeles-Satellite 0.003 0.000 1.63 989
JSC572 Port Angeles-Satellite 0.002 -0.000 1.42 608
JSC610 Olympia 0.036 0.001 0.68 10,221
JSC620 Lewis County 0.014 -0.000 0.10 3,921
JSC621 Lewis County-Satellite 0.002 0.000 0.24 669
JSC630 Aberdeen 0.014 -0.000 0.13 3,904
JSC640 Raymond 0.007 0.000 0.09 1,924
JSC650 Cowlitz County 0.020 0.000 0.68 5,573
JSC660 Vancouver 0.034 0.000 0.15 9,601
JSC670 Columbia Gorge 0.007 0.000 1.05 1,943
JSC810 Spokane 0.063 -0.000 0.16 17,671
JSC820 Pullman 0.002 0.000 0.60 665
JSC821 Pullman-Satellite 0.003 -0.000 0.92 735
JSC830 Colville 0.008 0.000 1.16 2,392
JSC832 Colville-Satellite 0.003 -0.000 0.41 768
JSC835 Colville-Satellite 0.002 0.000 0.40 456
JSC840 Moses Lake 0.022 -0.000 0.38 6,178
JSC860 Okanogan 0.015 -0.001* 1.93 3,996
JSC870 Wenatchee 0.029 -0.001 1.37 7,925
JSC910 Ellensburg 0.006 0.000 0.37 1,775
JSC920 Yakima 0.048 0.000 0.42 13,461
JSC940 Sunnyside 0.028 . -0.000 0.28 7,907
JSC950 Tri-Cities 0.037 -0.000 0.33 10,266
JSC960 Walla Walla 0.010 -0.000 1.03 2,687
JSC980 Shared Work 0.002 0.000 0.42 459
JSC990 Interstate 0.025 -0.001 1.00
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Table 1. (Continued)
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for S&!1ple
Name Description Mean Group8 Difference SizeD
AG Industry, agriculture = 1 0.080 -0.001 0.95 22,265
MINING Industry, mining = 1 0.003 O.()OO 0.93 956
CONST Industry, construction= 1 0.160 -0.001 0.77 44,549
MANU Industry, manufacturing= 1 0.178 0.001 0.71 49,824
TCPU InduStry, trans., comm... = 1 0.050 0.001 0.63 13,990
WHOLE Industry, wholesale trade= 1 0.063 -0.001 0.85 17,389
RETAIL Industry, retail trade = 1 0.157 0.001 0.64 44,010 .
FIRE Industry, fmance, 0.037 0.001 0.60 10,406
insurane=1
SERVICE Industry, services = 1 0.217 -0.001 0.82 60,335
PUBLIC Industry, public 0.019 0.001* 1.87 5,254
administration= 1
SICMISS Industry, missing = 1 0.036 0.000 0.10 10,004
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Group8 Difference Sizeb
PRIVATE Private ownership code, 0.920 -0.002* 1.65 256,358
l=yes
GOVT Government ownership code, 0.045 0.002** 2.08 12,620
l=yes
Difference for
Variable Variable Control Group Treatment T-statistic for Sample
Name Description Mean Group8 Difference Sizeb
PROFTECH Occ, prof, tech, 0.161 0.002 0.95 45,143
managerial = 1
CLERSALE Occ, clerical and sales =1 0.174 -0.001 0.66 48,528
SERVOCC Occ, services=1 0.110 0.002 1.19 30,777
AGFOREST Occ, ag, forestry, fishery =1 0.082 -0.002** 2.01 22,738
PROCESS Occ, processing=1 0.049 -0.001 1.43 13,691
MACHINE Occ, machine trades = 1 0.053 0.000 0.27 14,763
BENCH Occ, bench work= 1 0.028 0.001 1.50 7,830
STRUCT Occ, structural work=1 0.178 -0.000 0.01 49,759
MISC Occ, miscellaneous=1 0.139 0.001 0.37 38,708
DOTMISS Occupation, missing = 1 0.025 -0.000 0.32 7,045
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Note: Control group means are provided for reference in examining treatment impacts.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
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WCE - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
Benefit Deadweight Behavioral
Year Cost Response
16.51
0.39**
(6.76)
11.66
-0.03
(0.54)
3.68
0.36**
(10.33)
1.76 1.76 2.09
0.57** 0.33** 0.24**
(25.94) (21.38) (10.03)
1.92 1.92 1.59
-0.20** -0.33** 0.13**
(9.37) (22.37) (6.30)
13.41 13.41 13.74
0.54** 0.33** 0.21**
(10.86) (9.38) (4.19)
$2,731 $2,731 $2,770
67** 39** 28**
(5.3) (4.35) (2.2)
12.33
0.28** 0.19** 0.09**
(6.04) (5.74) (1.97)
0.268
0.006**
(2.84)
Summary of Treatment Impacts (t-statistics in parentheses)
EXHAUST - Proportion of beneficiaries who receive their full VI
entitlement in benefit payments
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
FrEWEEKS - Full-time equivalent weeks of VI compensation
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
WCUI - Weeks claimed and a DI payment
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
WCENUI - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported and no VI
payment
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
Outcome
WCEUI - Weeks claimed of VI with earnings reported and a VI payment
Coptrol Mean
Treatment Impact
WC - Weeks claimed of DI
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
WCNE - Weeks claimed of VI with no earnings reported
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
UITOTAL - DI benefits received in Total
Control Mean
Treatment Impact
Table 2.
Table 3. Aggregate Cost of Proposed Earnings Deduction Formula
(t-statistics in parentheses)
VI Benefits Sample Total VI
per Recipient Size Payments
Treatment $ 2,797 69,105 $ 193,304,652
Control $ 2,731 208,950 $ 570,556,781
Impact $ 67** 69,105 $ 4,607,230
(5.28)
Deadweight $ 39** 69,105 $ 2,677,128
(4.35)
Response $ 28** 69,105 $ 1,930,103
(2.20)
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
Percent of
VI Payments
0.61%
0.35%
0.25%
Table 4. Cost of Proposed Earnings Deduction FormUla had it been Universally
Implemented
VI Benefits Sample Total VI
per Recipient Size Payments
Proposed $ 2,797 278,055 $ 777,792,129
Existing $ 2,731 278,055 $ 759,254,202
Additional Cost $ 18,537,927
Percent of
VI Payments
2.44%
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Control 16.51 13.41 12.33 2,731 0.268
0.174
0.004**
(2.45)
55**
(4.8)
1,9828.98
0.25**
(5.64)
9.47
0.37**
(8.13)
0.38**
(8.12)
10.31
Weeks claimed of UI.
Weeks claimed and a UI payment.
Full-time equivalent weeks of UI compensation.
= UITOTALIWBA
WBA = Weekly Benefit Amount
ur benefits received in Total
Proportion of beneficiaries who receive their full UI entitlement in benefit payments.
WC WCUI FTEWEEKS UITOTAL EXHAUST
Benefit Year and First Spell Impact Estimates on Various Outcomes
(t-statistics in parentheses)
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Treatment minus 0.21** 0.09** 28**
New Control (4.19) (1.97) (2.2)
Treatment minus 0.39** 0.54** 0.28** 67** 0.006**
Control (6.76) (10.86) (6.04) (5.3) (2.84)
New Control 0.33** 0.19** 39**
minus Control (9.38) (5.74) (4.4)
UITOTAL:
EXHAUST:
Treatment minus
Control
Control
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
WC:
WCUI:
FTEWEEKS:
Notes:
Table 5.
Table 6. Treatment Impacts on Earnings (t-statistics in parentheses)
Treatment Control Treatment
Mean Mean Impact
Reported in Benefit Year $1,317 $1,218 $99**
(7.0)
Reported in First Spell $183 $118 $65**
(28.8)
Benefit Year Wage Records $13,214 $13,276 -$62
(0.9)
Base Period Earnings $18,598 $18,524 $74
(1.3)
Sample Size 69,105 208,950
Note: Base period earnings will normally exceed benefit year earnings because (1) there is unemployment in the
benefit year, and (2) wage records for the benefit year does include earnings on federal jobs or interstate
jobs while these earnings are added to determine base period earnings.
Also, earnings in the benefit year based on wage records were estimated on a sample which excluded 63
persons in the control group and 15 persons in the treatment group who showed earnings in at least one
q~er exceeding $100,000.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
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Table 7. Benefit Year Earnings Reported Hazard Rates
Week in Treatment First Exit Control First Exit Treatment
Benefit Year Risk Set Earnings Rate Risk Set Earnings Rate Impact
1 69,105 18,100 0.262 208,950 54,407 0.260 0.002
2 51,005 2,775 0.054 154,543 8,407 0.054 0.000
3 48,230 1,956 0.041 146,136 5,519 0.038 0.003**
4 46,274 1,509 0.033 140,617 4,435 0.032 0.001
5 44,765 1,219 0.027 136,182 3,503 0.026 0.002*
6 43,546 1,038 0.024 132,679 3,078 0.023 0.001
7 42,508 879 ·0.021 129,601 2,630 0.020 0.000
8 41,629 789 0.019 126,971 2,391 0.019 0.000
9 40,840 713 0.017 124,580 2,153 0.017 0.000
10 40,127 633 0.016 122,427 2,037 0.017 -0.001
11 39,494 606 0.015 120,390 1,799 0.015 0.000
12 38,888 547 0.014 118,591 1,664 0.014 0.000
13 38,341 524 0.014 116,927 1,569 0.013 0.000
14 37,817 475 0.013 115,358 1,423 0.012 0.000
15 37,342 443 0.012 113,935 1,289 0.011 0.001
16 36,899 398 0.011 112,646 1,239 0.011 -0.000
17 36,501 384 0.011 111,407 1,110 0.010 0.001
18 36,117 347 0.010 110,297 1,105 0.010 -0.000
19 35,770 310 0.009 109,192 956 0.009 -0.000
20 35,460 306 0.009 108,236 921 0.009 0.000
21 35,154 282 0.008 107,315 808 0.008 0.000
22 34,872 228 0.007 106,507 832 0.008 -0.001 **
23 34,644 248 0.007 105,675 716 0.007 0.000
24 34,396 202 0.006 104,959 601 0.006 0.000
25 34,194 179 0.005 104,358 644 0.006 -0.001 *
26 34,015 204 0.006 103,714 523 0.005 0.001 **
27 33,811 172 0.005 103,191 512 0.005 0.000
28 33,639 134 0.004 102,679 458 0.004 -0.000
29 33,505 164 0.005 102,221 483 0.005 0.000
30 33,341 154 0.005 101,738 441 0.004 0.000
31 33,187 114 0.003 101,297 425 0.004 -0.001 *
32 33,073 96 0.003 100,872 342 0.003 -0.000
33 32,977 63 0.002 100,530 231 0.002 -0.000
34 32,914 69 0.002 100,299 218 0.002 -0.000
35 32,845 67 0.002 100,081 215 0.002 -0.000
36 32,778 61 0.002 99,866 224 0.002 -0.000
37 32,717 80 0.002 99,642 231 0.002 0.000
38 32,637 59 0.002 99,411 189 0.002 -0.000
39 32,578 66 0.002 99,222 195 0.002 0.000
40 32,512 60 0.002 99,027 190 0.002 -0.000
41 32,452 52 0.002 98,837 179 0.002 -0.000
42 32,400 63 0.002 98,658 187 0.002 0.000
43 32,337 67 0.002 98,471 170 0.002 0.000
44 32,270 65 0.002 98,301 206 0.002 -0.000
45 32,205 56 0.002 98,095 163 0.002 0.000
46 32,149 62 0.002 97,932 178 0.002 0.000
47 32,087 53 0.002 97,754 191 0.002 -0.000
48 32,034 67 0.002 97,563 177 0.002 0.000
49 31,967 54 0.002 97,386 185 0.002 -0.000
50 31,913 52 0.002 97,201 199 0.002 -0.000
51 31,861 64 0.002 97,002 172 0.002 0.000
52 31,797 48 0.002 96,830 172 0.002 -0.000
No Eamings 31,749 96,658
Cumulative 69,105 37,356 0.541 208,950 112,292 0.537 0.004
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Table 8. First Spell Earnings Reported Hazard Rates
Week Since Treatment First Exit Control First Exit Treatment
Waiting Week Risk Set Earnings Rate Risk Set Earnings Rate Impact
1 53,013 8,740 16.49 158,748 23,471 14.79 1.70**
2 44,273 1,938 4.38 135,277 5,075 3.75 0.63**
3 42,335 1,263 2.98 130,202 3,167 2.43 0.55**
4 41,072 1,026 2.50 127,035 2,475 1.95 0.55**
5 40,046 728 1.82 124,560 1,918 1.54 0.28**
6 39,318 648 1.65 122,642 1,738 1.42 0.23**
7 38,670 570 1.47 120,904 1,428 1.18 0.29**
8 38,100 547 1.44 119,476 1,345 1.13 0.31 **
9 37,553 422 1.12 118,131 1,168 0.99 0.14**
10 37,131 459 1.24 116,963 1,053 0.90 0.34**
11 36,672 380 1.04 115,910 942 0.81 0.22**
12 36,292 357 0.98 114,968 909 0.79 0.19**
13 35,935 298 0.83 114,059 795 0.70 0.13**
14 35,637 304 0.85 113,264 717 0.63 0.22**
15 35,333 231 0.65 112,547 655 0.58 0.07
16 35,102 251 0.72 111,892 609 0.54 0.17**
17 34,851 206 0.59 111,283 561 0.50 0.09**
18 34,645 189 0.55 110,722 506 0.46 0.09**
19 34,456 163 0.47 110,216 436 0.40 0.08*
20 34,293 135 0.39 109,780 416 0.38 0.01
21 34,158 128 0.37 109,364 397 0.36 0.01
22 34,030 135 0.40 108,967 389 0.36 0.04
23 33,895 97 0.29 108,578 248 0.23 0.06
24 33,798 95 0.28 108,330 281 0.26 0.02
25 33,703 98 0.29 108,049 227 0.21 0.08**
26 33,605 84 0.25 107,822 224 0.21 0.04
27 33,521 58 0.17 107,598 218 0.20 -0.03
28 33,463 85 0.25 107,380 213 0.20 0.06*
29 33,378 80 0.24 107,167 169 0.16 0.08**
30 33,298 44 0.13 106,998 186 0.17 -0.04
31 33,254 1 0.00 106,812 3 0.00 0.00
32 33,253 0 0.00 106,809 0 0.00 0.00
33 33,253 0 0.00 106,809 1 0.00 -0.00
34 33,253 1 0.00 106,808 2 0.00 0.00
35 33,252 0 0.00 106,806 0 0.00 0.00
36 33,252 0 0.00 106,806 1 0.00 -0.00
37 33,252 0 0.00 106,805 0 0.00 0.00
38 33,252 0 0.00 106,805 1 0.00 -0.00
39 33,252 1 0.00 106,804 0 0.00 0.00
40 33,251 0 0.00 106,804 0 0.00 0.00
41 33,251 0 0.00 106,804 0 0.00 0.00
42 33,251 0 0.00 106,804 0 0.00 0.00
43 33,251 0 0.00 106,804 1 0.00 -0.00
44 33,251 0 0.00 106,803 1 0.00 -0.00
45 33,251 0 0.00 106,802 0 0.00 0.00
46 33,251 0 0.00 106,802 0 0.00 0.00
47 33,251 0 0.00 106,802 1 0.00 -0.00
48 33,251 0 0.00 106,801 0 0.00 0.00
49 33,251 0 0.00 106,801 0 0.00 0.00
50 33,251 0 0.00 106,801 0 0.00 0.00
51 33,251 0 0.00 106,801 0 0.00 0.00
52 33,251 0 0.00 106,801 0 0.00 0.00
No Earnings 33,251 106,801
Cumulative 53,013 19,762 37.28 158,748 51,947 32.72 4.55**
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Table 9. First Spell UI Exit Hazard Rates
Week Since Treatment Exit Exit Co
Waitin Week Risk Set UI Rate Risk e
1 53,013 7,515 14.18 158,748 -0.86**
2 45,498 3,330 7.32 134,880 -0.68**,
3 42,168 3,579 8.49 124,092 11,098 8.94 -0.46**
4 38,589 2,218 5.75 112,994 6,503 5.76 -0.01
5 36,371 2,739 7.53 106,491 8,031 7.54 -0.01
6 33,632 1,588 4.72 98,460 4,784 4.86 -0.14
7 32,044 2,106 6.57 93,676 6,360 6.79 -0.22
8 29,938 1,345 4.49 87,316 3,997 4.58 -0.09
9 28,593 1,915 6.70 83,319 5,378 6.45 0.24
10 26,678 1,053 3.95 77,941 3,386 4.34 -0.40
11 25,625 1,579 6.16 74,555 4,569 6.13 0.03
12 24,046 916 3.81 69,986 2,780 3.97 -0.16
13 23,130 1,323 5.72 67,206 3,952 5.88 -0.16
14 21,807 756 3.47 63,254 2,232 3.53 -0.06
15 21,051 1,174 5.58 61,022 3,156 5.17 0.41 **
16 19,877 663 3.34 57,866 2,008 3.47 -0.13
17 19,214 946 4.92 55,858 2,875 5.15 -0.22
18 18,268 556 3.04 52,983 1,613 3.04 -0.00
19 17,712 833 4.70 51,370 2,374 4.62 0.08
20 16,879 434 2.57 48,996 1,372 2.80 -0.23
21 16,445 706 4.29 47,624 1,924 4.04 0.25
22 15,739 364 2.31 45,700 1,078 2.36 -0.05
23 15,375 530 3.45 44,622 1,406 . 3.15 0.30*
24 14,845 291 1.96 43,216 796 1.84 0.12
25 14,554 414 2.84 42,420 1,126 2.65 0.19
26 14,140 241 1.70 41,294 679 1.64 0.06
27 13,899 372 2.68 40,615 943 2.32 0.35**
28 13,527 216 1.60 39,672 610 1.54 0.06
29 13,311 364 2.73 39,062 1,017 2.60 0.13
30 12,947 104 0.80 38,045 323 0.85 -0.05
31 12,843 61 0.47 37,722 177 0.47 0.01
32 12,782 50 0.39 37,545 94 0.25 0.14
33 12,732 35 0.27 37,451 88 0.23 0.04
34 12,697 31 0.24 37,363 57 0.15 0.09
35 12,666 28 0.22 37,306 70 0.19 0.03
36 12,638 12 0.09 37,236 41 0.11 -0.02
37 12,626 17 0.13 37,195 39 0.10 0.03
38 12,609 17 0.13 37,156 29 0.08 0.06*
39 12,592 11 0.09 37,127 30 0.08 0.01
40 12,581 11 0.09 37,097 15 0.04 0.05
41 12,570 8 0.06 37,082 23 0.06 0.00
42 12,562 9 0.07 37,059 13 0.04 0.04*
43 12,553 7 0.06 37,046 19 0.05 0.00
44 12,546 8 0.06 37,027 9 0.02 0.04*
45 12,538 7 0.06 37,018 14 0.04 0.02
46 12,531 5 0.04 37,004 6 0.02 0.02
47 12,526 3 0.02 36,998 9 0.02 -0.00
48 12,523 3 0.02 36,989 3 0.01 0.02
49 12,520 6 0.05 36,986 15 0.04 0.01
50 12,514 7 0.06 36,971 12 0.03 0.02
51 12,507 0 0.00 36,959 0 0.00
0.00
52 12,507 0 0.00 36,959 0 0.00
0.00
No Exit 12,507 36,959
Cumulative 53,013 40,506 76.41 158,748 121,789 76.72
-0.31
Table 10. Tests of Randomization Using Subgroup Definitions
t-statistic
Variable Label Treatment Control Difference on Difference
MALE Gender, male=1 0.638 0.634
-0.004 * 1.95
FEMALE Gender, female=1 0.362 0.366
AGELT30 Age less than 30 0.315 0.313 -0.002 0.81
AGEGE45 Age greater than or equal to 45 0.238 0.238 0.000 0.16
AGE3044 Age 30 through 44 0.469 0.470 0.001 0.32
BLACK Race, black=1 0.036 0.037 0.001 1.01
OTHER Race, other=1 0.164 0.161 -0.003 * 1.64
WHITE Race, white=1 0.800 0.802 0.002 1.05
LTHS Education, less than high school 0.265 0.263 -0.002 0.96
COLLVOC Education, some college or vocation 0.257 0.258 0.001 0.55
BAMAPHD Education, bachelors or higher 0.072 0.072 0.000 0.17
HSGED Education, high school or GED 0.406 0.407 0.001 0.28
EASTERN Location, Eastern Washington 0.289 0.287 -0.002 0.94
RESTOFST Location, rest of state 0.326 0.327 0.001 0.32
PUGET Location, Puget Sound 0.385 0.387 0.001 0.57
VIETNAM Vietnam Veteran 0.058 0.058 -0.001 0.65
OTHERVET Veteran, other 0.074 0.074 -0.000 0.34
NONVET Veteran, not a veteran 0.868 0.869 0.001 0.71
UORS Union or stand-by 0.317 0.316 -0.001 0.49
NOUORS NOT union or stand-by 0.683 0.684
GOVT Ownership code, government 0.046 0.048 0.002 ** 1.99
PRIVATE Ownership code, private 0.954 0.952
SERVICE Industry, services 0.225 0.224 -0.001 0.64
MANU Industry, manufacturing 0.184 0.185 0.001 0.56
OTHERIND Industry, other 0.591 0.591 0.000 0.10
WHITECOL Occupation, white collar 0.335 0.337 0.002 0.90
BLUECOL Occupation, blue collar 0.641 0.640 -0.002 0.73
BPEQI BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes 0.251 0.248 -0.003 * 1.69
BPEQ2 BPE in second quartile, .1=yes 0.250 0.251 0.001 0.51
BPEQ3 BPE in third quartile, 1=yes 0.250 0.251 0.001 0.62
BPE04 BPE in highest quartile, 1=yes 0.250 0.251 0.001 0.56
Sample Size 66,012 199,627
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
-
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# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 90 percent confidence level.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impact on Weeks Claitnetl
2.62
2.13
4.27
3.65
1.21
4.20
2.62
4.56
3.35
5.28
0,63
6.59
3.57
2.96
4.51
1.36
6.45
0.44
3.45
5.88
4.48
1.91
4.52
4.33
4.42
0.76
3.42
5.73
2.49
3.41
5.05
t-statistic
on Impact
0.155 ##
0.491
0.321
0.247
0.493
0.452
0.574
0.262
0.340
0.170
0.389
0.112
0.748 #
0.367
0.371
0.382
0.398
0.302
0.428
0.148 #
0.491
0.599
0.418
0.266
0.417
0.436
0.330
0.463
-0.233 #
0.533
0.374
Treatment
Impact
Control
Mean
17.460 @@
15.998
14.649@@
16.117 @@
17.353 @@
17.820
17.220@@
16.421
17.753 @@
16.646 @@
16.407
16.383 @@
15.443 @@
16.803
16.559
16.487
16.512@@
16.906 @@
18.447 @@
15.917
16.917
15.764 @@
16.851
16.457
16.891 @@
16.434
13.613 @@
19.358 @@
17.141
15.991 @@
17.436
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location, Puget Sound
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile, 1=yes
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry, other
Ownership code, government
Ownership code, private
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran, not a veteran
O~cupation, white collar
Occupation, blue collar
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education, high school or GED
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other= 1
Race, white = 1
Label
Gender, male = 1
. Gender, female = 1
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
UORS
NOUORS
BPEQ1
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
Variable
LTHS
COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
Table 11.
Table 12. Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impact on Weeks Claimed with Earnings
Reported
Variable
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQ1
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
f
Label
Gender, male = 1
Gender, female = 1
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other= 1
Race. white = 1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education, high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location. PugetSound
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran, not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code. private
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry. other
Occupation, white collar
Occupation. blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile. 1=yes
Control
Mean
3.341@@
4.357
2.420@@
5.056@@
3.948
2.481@@
4.181@@
3.667
3.860@@
3.674
3.731
3.617
4.341@@
3.568@@
3.352
4.029@@
3.184@@
3.737
5.071@@
3.089
4.412@@
3.722
3.598@@
3.282@@
3.960
3.259@@
3.947
3.329@@
3.933@@
3.895@@
3.657
Treatment
Impact
0.291##
0.479
0.288
0.473
0.349
0.470
0.271
0.372
0.200##
0.396
0.398
0.433
0.397
0.371
0.322
0.271
0.486
0.355
0.428
0.327
0.127
0.371
0.488
0.203
0.360
0.313
0.383
0.350
0.334
0.383
0.370
t-statistic
on Impact
6.18
7.41
4.37
6.26
6.54
2.49
2.82
9.23
2.66
5.49
2.82
7.65
5.76
5.87
5.49
1.73
3.63
9.22
6.26
7.34
0.77
10.18
6.17
2.40
7.73
4.42
8.15
4.63
4.66
5.38
4.84
# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence level.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
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Table 13.
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
'COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQI
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
Subgroup Analysis
Age less than
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other = 1
Race. white = 1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education. high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location. PugetSound
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran, not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code. private
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry, other
Occupation, white collar
Occupation, blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile, 1=yes
2844@@
2008@@
3286@@
2951
2682@@
2090@@
2853
2218@@
3075@@
3990@@
2611
2360@@
2566@@
3127
3469@@
3076@@
2633
2682@@
2741
2895@@
2687
2643@@
2696
2718
3275@@
2424
1400@@
1993@@
3065@@
4343
43
57
77
-50#
95
60
51
80
92
51
54
54
73
15
134
59
46
69
22
63
80
43
60
20##
82
28#
23##
98
97
2.32
4.40
0.81
3.01
4.53
2.06
3.39
1.99
2.78
2.40
2.63
3.82
0.30
3.05
4.67
2.06
4.70
0.40
5.33
3.10
1.55
3.96
0.86
5.36
1.13
0.97
4.22
3.87
# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at
the 90 percent confidence level.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence level.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
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Table 14. Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impact on Full Time Equivalent Weeks
# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 90 percent confidence level.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence level.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
Variable
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
. RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQI
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
Label
Gender, male = 1
Gender, female = 1
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other = 1
Race. white = 1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education. high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location. PugetSound
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran, not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code, private
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry. other
O~upation, white collar
Occupation. blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile. 1=yes
Control
Mean
11.975@@
12.873
10.681@@
13.809@@
12.685
13.293@@
12.094@@
12.291
12.032@@
12.802@@
14.459@@
11.775
12.113@@
11.636@@
13.005
12.900@@
12.678@@
12.214
10.900@@
12.927
12.701@@
12.206
12.555@@
11.455@@
12.346
13.830@@
11.473
10.846@@
11.808@@
13.044@@
13.406
Treatment
Impact
0.246
0.328
0.166
0.309
0.337
-0.360##
0.441
0.271
0.163
0.366
0.455
0.261
0.271
0.195
0.349
-0.007
0.490
0.278
0.210
0.307
0.147
0.283
0.393
0.237
0.244
0.069##
0.381
0.233
0.178
0.381
0.313
t-statistic
on Impact
3.99
3.88
1.92
3.11
4.82
1.45
3.50
5.13
;
1.65
3.88
2.46
3.52
3.00
2.35
4.54
0.04
2.79
5.51
2.35
5.24
0.67
5.92
3.80
2.13
4.00
0.75
6.18
2.35
1.89
4.07
3.12
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Table 15. Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impact on Exhaustion Rate
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# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at
the 90 percent confidence leve.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly- different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence leve.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence leve.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
Variable
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQ1
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
Label
Gender, male = 1
Gender. female = 1
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other = 1
Race. white = 1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education. high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location. Puget Sound
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran. not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code. private
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry. other
Occupation, white collar
Occupation. blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile. 1=yes
Control
Mean
0.2494@@
0.2978
0.2176@@
0.3177@@
0.2764
0.3585@@
0.2789@@
0.2599
0.2881@@
0.2738@@
0.3011@@
0.2421
0.2517@@
0.2518@@
0.2908
0.2722
0.2647
0.2665
0.1866@@
0.3029
0.2897@@
0.2645
0.2841@@
0.2543@@
0.2622
0.3129@@
0.2418
0.2937@@
0.2699@@
0.2654@@
0.2392
Treatment
Impact
0.0056
0.0055
0.0058
0.0047
0.0058
-0.0228##
0.0067
0.0066
0.0022
0.0042
0.0104
0.0077
0.0054
0.0053
0.0058
0.0021
0.0044
0.0058
0.0004
0.0079
0.0034
0.0056
0.0074
0.0045
0.0051
-0.0017##
0.0092
0.0025
0.0049
0.0083
0.0064
t-statistic
on Impact
2.14
1.54
1.59
1.14
1.97
2.19
1.26
2.95
0.52
1.06
1.33
2.48
1.42
1.53
1.80
0.25
0.60
2.76
0.11
3.21
0.37
2.81
1.70
0.97
2.01
0.44
3.55
0.60
1.24
2.12
1.53
Table 16. Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impact on Total Reported Earnings
- 80-
# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at
the 90 percent confidence level.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence level.
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
Variable
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
'COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQI
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
Label
Gender, male = 1
Gender. female = 1
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black= 1
Race, other = 1
Race. white = 1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education. high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location. Puget Sound
VietD.am Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran. not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code. private
Industry, services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry. other
Occupation, white collar
Occupation. blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile. 1=yes
Control
Mean
1333@@
1034
639@@
1780@@
1368
692@@
1085@@
1280
1152@@
1245
1231
1261
1208
1251@
1217
1802@@
1184
1190
2198@@
788
1234
1249
984@@
1105@@
1394
880@@
1409
756@@
1012@@
1307@@
1798
Treatment
Impact
92
118
87
114
105
102
107
100
50#
115
118
124
99
113
94
169
169
92
148##
80
62
103
132
48
106
92
106
73#
65##
119
149
t-statistic
on Impact
4.88
4.56
3.30
3.76
4.91
1.35
2.76
6.21
1.65
3.97
2.09
5.46
3.60
4.46
3.99
2.69
3.15',.
5.94
5.40
4.47
0.93
7.09
4.18
1.41
5.71
3.23
5.65
2.41
2.26
4.16
4.88
Subgroup Analysis ofTreatment Impact on Average Reported Weekly Earnings
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# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
90 percent confidence level.
Categories are segmented by a blank line.
## Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at
the 95 percent confidence level. .
@@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
95 percent confidence level.
@ Subgroup control group significantly different from control group for bottom subgroup listed in category at the 90
percent confidence level.
Table 17.
Variable
MALE
FEMALE
AGELT30
AGEGE45
AGE3044
BLACK
OTHER
WHITE
LTHS
COLLVOC
BAMAPHD
HSGED
EASTERN
RESTOFST
PUGET
VIETNAM
OTHERVET
NONVET
UORS
NOUORS
GOVT
PRIVATE
SERVICE
MANU
OTHERIND
WHITECOL
BLUECOL
BPEQ1
BPEQ2
BPEQ3
BPEQ4
Label
Gender, male=l
Gender, female=1
Age less than 30
Age greater than or equal to 45
Age 30 through 44
Race, black=l
Race, other=1
Race, white=1
Education, less than high school
Education, some college or vocation
Education, bachelors or higher
Education, high school or GED
Location, Eastern Washington
Location, rest of state
Location, Puget Sound
Vietnam Veteran
Veteran, other
Veteran, not a veteran
Union or stand-by
NOT union or stand-by
Ownership code, government
Ownership code, private
Industry,services
Industry, manufacturing
Industry, other
Occupation, white collar
Occupation, blue collar
BPE in lowest quartile, 1=yes
BPE in second quartile, 1=yes
BPE in third quartile, 1=yes
BPE in highest quartile, 1=yes
Control
Mean
375@@
243
260@@
361@@
347
280@@
251@@
344
284@@
342@@
376@@
335
278@@
336@@
360
427@@
352@@
316
407@@
274
286@@
330
288@@
328@@
342
300@@
338
218@@
254@@
328@@
483
Treatment
Impact
-3
-1
-2
-4
-2
-7
-1
-3
-4.
-2
-7
-1
-2
-3
-2
11##
o
-4
-2
-3
6
-3
-6
-2
-1
-2
-3
-3
-2
-2
-3
t-statistic
on Impact
2.00
0.47
0.81
1.61
1.17
0.96
0.33
1.82
1.57
0.94
1.58
0.35
0.86
1.45
1.13
2.13
0.01
2.71
1.16
1.54
1.06
2.29
2.11
0.79
0.81
0.79
1.69
1.30
0.77
0.77
1.09
Table 18. Subgroup Analysis of Treatment Impacts on Various Outcome Measures
Variable WC WCE UITOTAL FTEWEEKS EXHAUST EARNINGS EARNWEEK
MALE 0.330** 0.291 **## 60** 0.246** 0.006 ** 92** -3**
FEMALE 0.463** 0.479** 64** 0.328** 0.005 118** -1
AGELT30 0.266** 0.288** 43** 0.166* 0.006 87** -2
AGEGE45 0.417** 0.473** 57** 0.309** 0.005 114** -4
AGE3044 0.436** 0.349** 77** 0.337** 0.006 ** 105** -2
BLACK -0.233# 0.470** -50# -0.360## -0.023 **## 102 -7
OTHER 0.533** 0.271 ** 95*·* 0.441 ** 0.007 107** -1
WHITE 0.374** 0.372** 60** 0.271 ** 0.007 ** 100** -3*
LTHS 0.148# 0.200**## 51** 0.163* 0.002 50*# -4
COLLVOC 0.491 ** 0.396** 80** 0.366** 0.004 115** -2
BAMAPHD' 0.599** 0.398** 92** 0.455** 0.010 118** -7
HSGED 0.418** 0.433** 51** 0.261** 0.008 ** 124** -1
" ~,t' ~~} ,~ ..
EASTERN 0.398** 0.397** 54** 0.271** 0.005 99**
'4'172 ..
RESTOFST 0.302** 0.371 ** 54** 0.195** 0.005 113** -3
PUGET 0.428** 0.322** 73** 0.349** 0.006 * 94** -2
VIElNAM 0.112 0.271 * 15 -0.007 0.002 169** 11**##
OTHERVET 0.748**# 0.486** 134** 0.490** 0.004 169** 0
NONVET 0.367** 0.355** 59** 0.278** 0.006 ** 92** -4**
UORS 0.371 ** 0.428** 46** 0.210** 0.000 148**## -2
NOUORS 0.382** 0.327** 69** 0.307** 0.008 ** 80** -3
GOVT 0.170 0.127 22 0.147 0.003 62 :6':~
PRIVATE 0.389** 0.371 ** 63** 0.283** 0.006 ** 103** -3·**
SERVICE 0.574** 0.488** 80** 0.393** 0.007 * 132** -6**
MANU 0.262* 0.203** 43 0.237** 0.005 48 -2
OTHERIND 0.340** 0.360** 60** 0.244** 0.005 ** 106** -1
WHITECOL 0.155## 0.313** 20## 0.069## -0.002 ## 92** -2
BLUECOL 0.491 ** 0.383** 82** 0.381** 0.009 ** 106** -3*
BPEQI 0.321 ** 0.350** 28# 0.233** 0.002 73**# -3
BPEQ2 0.247** 0.334** 23## 0.178* 0.005 65**## -2
BPEQ3 0.493** 0.383** 98** 0.381** 0.008 ** 119** -2
BPEQ4 0.452** 0.370** 97** 0.313** 0.006 149** -3
* Treatment impact significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
** Treatment impact significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
# Subgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category at the
90 percent confidence level.
## SUbgroup treatment impact significantly different from treatment impact for bottom subgroup listed in category
at the 95 percent confidence level.
WC = Weeks Claimed
WCE = Weeks Claimed with Earnings Reported
UITOTAL =Total Entitled ur Compensation
FTEWEEKS = Full Time Equivalent Weeks
EXHAUST = Exhaustion Rate
EARNINGS = Total Reported Earnings
EARNWEEK = Average Reported Weekly Earnings
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Table 19. Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Washington UI Earnings Deduction Experiment
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